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THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK:  
WHAT TO DO WHEN HEARSAY AND RULE 106 
COMPLETENESS COLLIDE 
Michael A. Hardin* 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides that when one party in a trial or 
hearing offers into evidence a portion of a statement in a misleading way, 
the opposing party can offer the rest, or some other portion of, that 
document or recorded statement at the same time if it is necessary for the 
factfinder to understand and contextualize the first part.  Sometimes, 
however, the other portion, or “remainder,” would be inadmissible if it 
were offered by itself, either because it is hearsay or for some other reason.  
This leaves the court in a difficult position:  Should it allow the remainder 
to be entered into evidence in violation of some other rule that would 
exclude it?  Or should the court exclude the remainder and allow the initial 
misleading portion to stand, uncorrected? 
Some circuits have held that Rule 106 must trump the other rules of 
evidence in order to do its job.  These courts admit otherwise inadmissible 
hearsay evidence for its truth.  Other circuits have held that if no 
independent hearsay exception exists for the remainder, it must be excluded 
despite Rule 106.  Finally, some opinions have suggested that Rule 106 
allows the remainder of a statement to be admitted for the narrow purpose 
of contextualizing the initial misleading portion. 
This Note argues the following:  if one party offers a misleading portion 
of a statement into evidence, the opposing party should be able to offer the 
remainder, but the jury should only be allowed to use it for context.  The 
evidentiary basis for doing so is not Rule 106, but rather the U.S. Supreme 
Court case Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, which holds that remainders 
necessary to correct misleading impressions are automatically relevant for 
a nonhearsay purpose.  The end of this Note offers courts a step-by-step 
process for judges to follow when ruling on whether to admit remainders. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Columbia 
University.  I would like to thank my advisor, Professor James Kainen, for challenging me to 
clarify my ideas, and my mother and father for teaching me the value of a good argument. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As Gerardo Lopez-Medina sat next to his attorney at the defense table, on 
trial for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, his half-
brother’s ghost spoke out from the witness stand, and testified that the two 
of them had possessed those drugs together.1  Lopez-Medina heard it, the 
jury heard it, and in closing argument, it was not lost on the prosecutor, who 
said that when the defendant’s “own half brother finger[ed] him,” it was 
“the final nail in the coffin.”2  In reality, Rogelio Lopez-Ahumado, the 
defendant’s half-brother, was sitting (very much alive) in a jail cell miles 
away.  He had already pled guilty to possessing the very same 
methamphetamine, stashed in the same truck, but had refused to testify for 
either the government or the defense in his half-brother’s trial.3  As a 
condition of his plea, Lopez-Ahumado had written a statement to the court 
admitting that the truck, where the authorities had found the drugs, 
belonged to Lopez-Medina, and that the drugs had belonged to both 
brothers.4  The “ghost” was actually Officer Johnson, reading from the very 
same statement that Lopez-Ahumado had to write before he could plead 
guilty.5 
However, the defendant (or rather his attorney) had a hand in summoning 
this ghost.  The defense strategy was to ask Officer Johnson whether Lopez-
Ahumado had already been arrested and had pled guilty to possessing the 
drugs in question.6  When the officer affirmed Lopez-Ahumado’s arrest and 
guilty plea, it was true, but it was not the entire story.  So, the court allowed 
the prosecution to have Officer Johnson read Lopez-Ahumado’s statement 
implicating Lopez-Medina.  The court permitted this reading to ensure that 
the jury would not mistakenly believe that Lopez-Ahumado had admitted to 
being the only person to whom those drugs belonged.7  From that point 
forward, the prosecution was free to treat what Lopez-Ahumado wrote in 
that statement as though he had said the words in open court.8 
In the Federal Rules of Evidence, when one party offers a statement that 
is misleading because it is incomplete, Rule 106, known as a version of the 
“rule of completeness,” allows the other side to stop the proceedings and 
“complete” the statement before any other evidence is presented.9  But what 
happens when another rule of evidence renders the remainder of the 
statement inadmissible?  Does the court have the power to admit it anyway, 
because completeness trumps one of the carefully crafted prohibitions on 
what may be received in evidence?  Should the court let the misleading 
 
 1. United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 724–25 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 729 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3. Id. at 722–23. 
 4. Id. at 723. 
 5. Id. at 725. 
 6. Id. at 723–25. 
 7. Id. at 725–26. 
 8. Id. at 729. 
 9. FED. R. EVID. 106. 
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statement stand and allow the jury to form the wrong idea about what was 
said?  Or can the judge fashion some kind of compromise? 
The federal circuit courts continue to split on how to analyze and rule on 
proposed completions of misleading statements under Rule 106.10  This 
Note examines Rule 106’s role in the trial process, its relationship with the 
other rules of evidence, and the different ways the courts have solved this 
problem.  Moreover, this Note provides courts with a step-by-step approach 
to Rule 106 “completeness” problems as they arise at trial. 
This Note is divided into three parts.  Part I serves as a primer, not only 
on Rule 106, but also on hearsay, the rule of evidence that Rule 106 must 
trump most often when it allows an out-of-court statement to be 
completed.11  Part I also discusses various other rules of evidence that may 
interact or conflict with Rule 106, as well as a U.S. Supreme Court case that 
addressed a completeness issue without invoking Rule 106.12  Part II breaks 
down the various analytical approaches that circuit and district courts have 
taken to determine whether Rule 106 trumps other evidence rules.  Finally, 
Part III argues that while Rule 106 technically should not trump any other 
rules of evidence, this does not mean that the remainder of a statement 
cannot be admitted.  Rather, if admitting the remainder of a partial 
statement is necessary to avoid misleading the factfinder, the remainder will 
almost never violate the rules of evidence in the first place:  it will not be 
hearsay, and it will serve a relevant purpose that does not prohibit its 
admission. 
I.  THE COMPLETE PICTURE:  RULE 106’S PLACE AMONG  
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Part I.A covers relevant evidence rules, including jury instructions 
limiting the purposes for which evidence is admitted.  Part I.B introduces 
the concept of “limited admissibility”—that is, the way evidence rules 
distinguish between proper and improper purposes for which juries may 
consider evidence.  Part I.C covers the concept of hearsay, discussing 
hearsay exceptions and exemptions, nonhearsay purposes of statements, and 
some of the inherent asymmetries in who is allowed to offer statements into 
evidence.  Part I.D discusses Rule 106’s basic function and how to 
determine if a remainder ought to be considered contemporaneously with 
the portion of the statement initially offered into evidence.13 
 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 12. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 13. For clarity, this Note will use the following terminology:  “proponent” will mean the 
party who initially offers a portion of the statement, document, or recording; “portion” will 
mean the original part of a statement, document, or recording that the proponent offers; 
“opponent” will mean the party against whom the portion is offered; and “remainder” will 
mean the other part or parts of the statement that the opponent wishes to offer to complete 
the portion. 
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A.  Basic Evidentiary Principles 
This section introduces a few basic rules of evidence that inform the 
discussion of other rules and evidentiary analysis in general. 
1.  Relevance and Rule 403 
Rule 401 states that evidence is relevant if it tends to make any fact of 
consequence more or less probable than that fact would be without such 
evidence.14  Rule 402 states that relevant evidence is generally admissible, 
except if admitting it would violate the U.S. Constitution, a federal statute, 
the other Federal Rules of Evidence, or other Supreme Court rules.15  Rule 
403 allows the judge to exclude relevant evidence on grounds of undue 
prejudice, if the probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed 
by (among other things) its unfairly prejudicial effect or its ability to 
mislead the jury.16  The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules defines 
undue prejudice as “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper 
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”17 
2.  Judges’ Control over Proceedings 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) gives the court “reasonable control over 
the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence.”18  
This is so the court can make the examinations and presentations effective 
for determining the truth, avoid wasting time, and protect witnesses from 
being harassed or embarrassed on the witness stand.19  Some courts have 
interpreted this rule to allow judges to apply Rule 106 to oral statements in 
addition to writings or recordings.20 
Rule 105 mandates that judges give proper jury instructions.  It reads:  “If 
the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a 
purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, 
on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct 
the jury accordingly.”21  Many of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit 
the use of evidence for one or more particular purposes but allow it for any 
other purpose.22  For this reason, judges must tell the jury how to use a 
piece of evidence in coming to a verdict.23  Limiting instructions may 
prevent undue prejudice by cautioning the jury against using evidence the 
 
 14. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 15. Id. R. 402. Compare id., with id. R. 106 (including no similar limitations on 
admissibility). 
 16. Id. R. 403. 
 17. Id. R. 403 advisory committee’s note. 
 18. Id. R. 611(a). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See infra Part I.D. 
 21. FED. R. EVID. 105. 
 22. See infra Part I.B. 
 23. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 105.02[1] 
(10th ed. 2011). 
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wrong way.24  However, sometimes a jury instruction is insufficient, 
because the risk of the jury misusing the evidence substantially outweighs 
whatever probative value the evidence has when used correctly.25  In these 
instances, the evidence will be inadmissible under Rule 403.26 
When one party introduces a piece of evidence that is inadmissible for 
one purpose but admissible for a different purpose, the opposing party has 
the duty to object and request a limiting instruction from the judge.27  The 
judge has no discretion to deny this limiting instruction.28  If the opposing 
party does not object, the evidence may be used for any purpose.29 
It is unclear how effective limiting instructions are at preventing juries 
from using evidence for prohibited purposes.  Jurors, uneducated in the law, 
may struggle to understand the difference between the permitted and 
prohibited purpose.30  Moreover, even if jurors understand the distinction, 
they still might unconsciously draw a forbidden inference.31  On the other 
hand, limiting instructions do constrain the attorneys.  In closing arguments, 
neither attorney may ask the jury to draw those forbidden inferences or 
make an argument using the evidence for an improper purpose.32 
B.  “Limited Admissibility” and Exclusion of Evidence: 
Relevant for the Right and Wrong Reasons 
This section discusses the “limited admissibility” principle inherent in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and gives examples of rules embodying this 
principle. 
1.  General Examples 
Many Rules of Evidence are “purpose-specific”; they bar the use of a 
certain kind of evidence for one particular purpose, but not other 
purposes.33  This general principle has been called “limited admissibility.”34 
 
 24. Id. § 105.02[4]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. § 105.02[2]. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. (citing Gray v. Busch Entm’t Corp., 886 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 30. See Daniel D. Blinka, Ethical Firewalls, Limited Admissibility, and Rule 703, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1235 (2007). But see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 59, at 259–60 
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (“Realistically, the instruction may not always be 
effective, but admission of the evidence with the limiting instruction is normally the best 
reconciliation of the competing interests.”). 
 31. See Blinka, supra note 30, at 1235. 
 32. See id. at 1236. 
 33. 1 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 105.02[1]. 
 34. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 30, § 59, at 259.  The limited admissibility 
approach is not without its critics.  One criticism is that it allows for “lawyerly ‘mischief,’” 
namely, that attorneys will use the existence of a single permissible purpose as a pretext to 
admit evidence that they hope the jury will actually consider for its impermissible purposes. 
See Blinka, supra note 30, at 1237–41. 
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For example, under Rule 404(b), a party cannot use evidence of a 
person’s prior crimes, wrongs, or acts in order to prove that the person has a 
certain character trait and acted in accordance with that trait on a particular 
occasion.35  Policy concerns underlie this rule:  evidence of a person’s 
character “subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to 
punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the 
evidence in the case shows actually happened.”36  However, this kind of 
evidence can be used for any other purpose besides proving that the person 
acted in conformity with the character trait.37 
Another policy-driven rule is Rule 407:  if A gets injured, and 
subsequently, B takes precautions that would have made A’s injury less 
likely had those precautions been taken earlier, A cannot use those 
subsequent precautions as evidence that B was at fault for A’s injury.38  A 
major justification for this rule is that if our legal system admitted this 
evidence to prove fault, it would punish people for fixing dangerous 
situations.39  Accordingly, defendants would be deterred from fixing the 
alleged cause of an injury for fear that the injured person would have a 
stronger case against them.40  However, evidence of subsequent precautions 
is admissible if offered for any other purpose.41 
Some rules, however, are exclusionary rather than inclusionary.  Instead 
of allowing evidence for any purpose that is not improper, they bar certain 
types of evidence outright, or admit evidence only if it is offered for a 
specific, proper purpose.42  These rules may also be based in policy 
considerations.43 
 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 36. Id. R. 404 advisory committee’s note (quoting 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, 
TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 
615 (1964), available at http://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub054.pdf). 
 37. Id. R. 404(b). 
 38. Id. R. 407. 
 39. See 2 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 407.02[2]. 
 40. See id.  For a criticism of this rationale, see id. 
 41. See FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (stating that, while evidence of an 
offer to settle a claim cannot be used as evidence of the claim’s validity or amount, or for 
impeachment purposes, because of a policy to promote settlement, it may be used for any 
other purpose); id. R. 409 advisory committee’s note (stating that an offer to pay medical, 
hospital, or similar expenses for an injury is not admissible to prove liability, so as not to 
discourage people from making humane gestures); id. R. 411 (stating that, while having or 
not having liability insurance cannot be used to prove or disprove negligence, so as to 
prevent juries from deciding cases on improper grounds, it can be used for other purposes). 
 42. See, e.g., id. R. 412 (prohibiting the use of a victim’s sexual history or predisposition 
and providing only limited and definite exceptions); id. R. 704(b) (unqualifiedly barring an 
expert opinion as to whether or not a criminal defendant had a “mental state or condition that 
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense”). 
 43. See, e.g., id. R. 412 advisory committee’s note (stating that the Rule protects alleged 
victims from intrusions into privacy, embarrassment, and sexual stereotyping). 
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2.  Rules Governing the Use of Original Documents and Recordings 
Several rules restrict witness testimony concerning the contents of 
written documents and recordings.  Rule 1001 says that a “‘writing’ 
consists of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent set down in any 
form.”44  Similarly, a “‘recording’ consists of letters, words, numbers, or 
their equivalent recorded in any manner.”45  Under Rule 1002, if a party 
seeks to prove the content of a writing or recording, she must provide the 
original, unless one of several exceptions is met.46  This does not mean that 
if a statement was made and a writing or recording of that statement exists, 
the party offering that statement must offer that writing or recording into 
evidence in order to prove that the statement was made.47  Instead, it means 
that if a party wants to use the writing or recording itself as proof of the 
information it contains, the party must introduce the original48 or a 
duplicate,49 rather than have a witness or other document simply summarize 
or retell the information contained therein.50  However, not all testimony 
about what a document or recording contains is for the purpose of proving 
its content.  For example, the rule may permit an expert witness to explain 
how she relied on information contained in a document when coming to her 
conclusion.51 
In addition to the exception allowing duplicates,52 there are several other 
exceptions to the requirement of originals.  The proponent of a document or 
recording can prove the content of a writing or recording without offering 
the original if “all the originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the 
proponent acting in bad faith,”53 if “an original cannot be obtained by any 
available judicial process,”54 if the opponent controlled the original but 
failed to produce it after notice that it “would be a subject of proof at the 
 
 44. Id. R. 1001(a). 
 45. Id. R. 1001(b). 
 46. Id. R. 1002.  An original writing or recording “means the writing or recording itself 
or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by the person who executed or issued it.” 
Id. R. 1001(d). 
 47. 5 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 1002.02 [1]. 
 48. FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
 49. Id. R. 1003.  “A ‘duplicate’ means a counterpart produced by a mechanical, 
photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that accurately 
reproduces the original.” Id. R. 1001(e).  A duplicate may be used in lieu of an original 
“unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity or the circumstances 
make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” Id. R. 1003. 
 50. 5 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 1002.02[1]; see R.R. Mgmt. Co. v. CFS La. 
Midstream Co., 428 F.3d 214, 216–17 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that affidavits and an 
excerpted and redacted version of a written agreement were offered to prove the contents of 
the agreement and thus were inadmissible under Rule 1002). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 566 F.3d 410, 412–14 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
an expert witness could testify to information he read in books and databases to come to his 
conclusion about where certain guns were manufactured). 
 52. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 1004(a). 
 54. Id. R. 1004(b). 
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trial or hearing,”55 or if the writing or recording is “not closely related to a 
controlling issue.”56  Furthermore, if an opposing party testifies or writes 
about the contents of a document, Rule 1007 allows the proponent of the 
document or recording to prove its content using the opponent’s testimony, 
deposition, or writing; the proponent does not need to have the original.57 
C.  Primer on Hearsay:  A Barrier with Many Gaps 
This section discusses the definition of hearsay, the various exceptions 
and exemptions to the rule prohibiting its admission, and ways that 
statements may be admitted for a different purpose than to prove the truth 
of the matters they assert. 
1.  Hearsay Defined 
Hearsay is a statement, made outside of the current trial or hearing, that is 
offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.58  In other 
words, hearsay is offered to prove that a fact asserted in the statement is 
actually true.  Hearsay generally is not admissible, except as provided by 
Supreme Court rules, federal statute, or the Federal Rules of Evidence.59 
Notably, a statement can be admissible despite the hearsay rule in three 
distinct ways.  First, a statement can be admitted pursuant to a hearsay 
exception.60  Under Rule 803, a hearsay statement is admissible if 
something about the statement indicates that it is sufficiently important and 
reliable.61  For example, if the “declarant” (the person who makes the 
statement) makes a statement to a medical doctor for the purposes of being 
diagnosed or treated, this statement is excepted from hearsay because the 
declarant has a strong motivation to be honest.62  A statement about a 
startling event made by a declarant who still feels startled is excepted 
because the declarant has little time to reflect and is less capable of 
deception.63  Statements “describing or explaining an event or condition, 
made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it” are considered 
reliable for the same reason.64  Rule 803(3) excepts statements about the 
declarant’s own state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition as 
it exists at the moment the statement is made.65  The rules deem these 
 
 55. Id. R. 1004(c). 
 56. Id. R. 1004(d). 
 57. Id. R. 1007. 
 58. Id. R. 801(a)–(c). 
 59. Id. R. 802. 
 60. See generally id. R. 803; id. R. 804. 
 61. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 803.02[1]. 
 62. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note. 
 63. Id. R. 803(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 64. Id. R. 803(1) advisory committee’s note. 
 65. Id. R. 803(3). 
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statements reliable because they are contemporaneous and based on one’s 
own unique perception.66 
Rule 804 provides additional hearsay exceptions for instances when the 
declarant is unavailable.67  A declarant is deemed unavailable if she falls 
into one of several delineated categories that preclude her from testifying.68  
One hearsay exception conditioned upon unavailability is if the statement, 
“when made, . . . had so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil 
or criminal liability” that “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position 
would have made [it] only if the person believed it to be true.”69 
Second, a hearsay statement may be admitted under one of the Rule 
801(d) hearsay exemptions,70 which are discussed below.71 
Third, a statement may bypass the hearsay rule if it does not meet all the 
criteria for hearsay.72  For example, because hearsay must be offered for the 
truth of the matter asserted, if a statement is not offered into evidence for 
the purpose of proving a fact that it asserts, it is not hearsay, and it may be 
admissible.73  The statement must still be relevant74 and not substantially 
more prejudicial than probative.75  To be relevant, the fact that the 
statement was made must tend to prove or disprove something independent 
of the truth of the statement itself.76  But offering a statement to prove 
something other than its truth creates a risk that the jury may nevertheless 
accept the statement as true.77  Therefore, for that statement to be 
admissible under Rule 403, that particular risk must not substantially 
outweigh the probative value of the nonhearsay purpose for which the 
statement is offered.78 
Of particular importance to this Note’s discussion of Rule 106 is the 
potential not-for-truth use of statements to help the factfinder better 
 
 66. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 803.02[4][a]. 
 67. See FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 68. See id. R. 804(a).  For example, the declarant may be dead, see id. R. 804(a)(4), may 
refuse to testify despite a court order, see id. R. 804(a)(2), or may be exempted from 
testifying by privilege, see id. R. 804(a)(1). 
 69. Id. R. 804(b)(3)(A).  This particular exception requires “corroborating circumstances 
that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.” Id. R. 804(b)(3)(B). 
 70. Id. R. 801(d).  Hearsay “exemptions” are a different category than hearsay 
“exceptions” under Rules 803 and 804. 
 71. See infra Part I.C.4. 
 72. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). 
 73. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[1][b].  Upon request, the judge must 
instruct the jury to consider this evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered, not 
as proof of the truth of the matter asserted. See FED. R. EVID. 105. 
 74. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 75. Id. R. 403. 
 76. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[1][b]. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.; cf. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 98, 103–04 (1933) (holding that a 
wife’s hearsay statement that her husband had poisoned her could not be restricted in 
purpose to prove only that she wanted to live, rather than the truth of the matter asserted, 
where “[t]he reverberating clang of those accusatory words would drown all weaker 
sounds”). 
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understand a conversation, event, or the subsequent actions of a person who 
heard the statement.79  In other words, a statement can be used not to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to provide “context.” 
2.  Nonhearsay Purpose:  Statements Offered for Context 
Parties may use a statement for many purposes other than to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted.  For example, in United States v. Colón-Díaz,80 
the First Circuit found that it was not plain error to admit statements 
suggesting that the defendant was the owner of a drug-selling location when 
the statements were only offered for the context of a law enforcement 
investigation.81  In that case, the district court properly admitted the 
statements insofar as they explained why the investigators went to a 
particular location and why some investigators gave certain directions to 
each other.82  Moreover, each time such a statement was elicited, the judge 
gave the requested instruction to the jurors that they were not to accept any 
of the statements as proof that the defendant owned the location.83 
But Rule 403 places limits on using such statements for this limited 
purpose.  In United States v. Johnson,84 the Second Circuit strongly 
criticized the district court for admitting several statements only as context 
to explain a subsequent investigation.85  In Johnson, the district court 
allowed a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent to testify to 
many incriminating statements from various informants (including drug-
purchasing customers) that corroborated suspicions the DEA already had 
about the defendant’s illegal activity.86  Although the Second Circuit upheld 
the conviction because of overwhelming evidence of guilt,87 the court 
scolded the prosecution for abusing “context” as a justification.88  In 
particular, the agent should have explained that the DEA’s actions were 
based on conversations with informants without disclosing the highly 
prejudicial substance of those conversations.89 
In this way, Rule 403 constrains nonhearsay use of prejudicial statements 
for context.90  Often, though, the probative value of context increases when 
 
 79. See 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[1][b]. 
 80. 521 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 33–35. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 529 F.3d 493 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 85. Id. at 497–98. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 502. 
 88. See id. at 501–02. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 501 (“When the evidence is proper with respect to an unimportant issue but 
improper and prejudicial on a crucially important issue, it is unlikely to pass the balancing 
test of Rule 403.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Williams, 133 F.3d 1048, 1050–52 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (finding error in allowing an FBI agent to testify about an anonymous tip that the 
defendant was the person who robbed a bank, because the testimony’s prejudicial value in 
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it responds to an argument or suggestion that the opposing party has made; 
this can tip the scales in favor of admitting the evidence.91 
Another type of context is a “reciprocal and integrated utterance;”92 the 
statement is offered not for the truth but to understand something said in 
response.  In United States v. Sorrentino,93 the court admitted a recorded 
conversation between the defendant and a confidential informant, offered 
by the prosecution.94  The court reasoned that the defendant’s statements 
were not hearsay because they were statements by a party opponent under 
Rule 801(d)(2)(a), and the informant’s statements were not hearsay because 
they were only offered to make the conversation understandable.95 
3.  Nonhearsay Purpose:  Explaining Expert Witness Testimony 
Another nonhearsay use, not unlike “context,” is when a party wants to 
elicit otherwise inadmissible evidence upon which an expert has relied in 
forming her opinion.  Under Rule 703, a court may allow testimony that 
might otherwise be hearsay, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but 
instead to help the jury understand and evaluate the expert’s opinion.96  
However, unlike context, statements that are offered under Rule 703 must 
pass a different balancing test than the one in Rule 403:  their probative 
value must substantially outweigh their prejudicial effect, rather than the 
other way around.97  If the court admits this evidence, the judge, upon 
request, must instruct the jury to consider it only to evaluate the expert’s 
opinion, not as substantive evidence.98  Without this limitation, an expert 
could testify to an inadmissible fact because it supported and explained her 
opinion, and then on closing argument, the attorney could use that 
testimony to argue that the same fact had been proven.99 
 
implicating the defendant substantially outweighed the probative value of explaining the 
investigation). 
 91. For example, in United States v. Gilliam, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
when it permitted testimony that, after leaving the crime scene, the police officer received an 
anonymous tip about a second gun at that crime scene. United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 
103–04 (2d Cir. 1993).  The defendant had implied on cross-examination that the only 
reason the officer returned to the scene was to harass the defendant and his friend. Id.  This 
increased the probative value of the fact that the anonymous tip was made (regardless of 
whether or not it was true), because it tended to show that the officer went to the scene to 
recover the gun, not to harass the defendant. See id. 
 92. United States v. Metcalf, 430 F.2d 1197, 1199 (8th Cir. 1970). 
 93. 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 94. Id. at 298. 
 95. Id.; see also United States v. Catano, 65 F.3d 219, 225 (1st Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Beal, 940 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 96. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (“[I]f the facts or data [underlying an opinion] would 
otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if 
their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect.”); 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 703.02[4]. 
 97. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 98. Id. R. 703 advisory committee’s note. 
 99. See Ian Volek, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 703:  The Back Door and the 
Confrontation Clause, Ten Years Later, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 973 (2011). 
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Limiting instructions in this context may be particularly hard for a jury to 
understand.100  If an expert has testified that she credited this hearsay 
evidence as true and used it to come to a conclusion, how can a juror use 
that hearsay to evaluate the opinion without crediting it as true as well?101  
Because of this difficulty, some commentators have argued that experts 
should not disclose any inadmissible underlying data, while others have 
said that all inadmissible underlying data should be received without 
limiting instructions.102 
However, the use of limiting instructions avoids the problems with either 
of these extremes.  As one commentator notes, without disclosing any 
underlying data, two competing experts could testify that they consulted the 
same data and came to opposite conclusions, and the jury would have to 
choose one blindly over the other.103  But if a jury is allowed to consider 
everything the expert says as substantive evidence, this gives the expert too 
much power to decide what is relevant and even what is admissible.104  
Thus, perhaps courts consider the use of limiting instructions the best of 
flawed options.105  Notably, these instructions once again restrict the 
attorneys’ ability to use the underlying data for an impermissible purpose, 
that is, as proof of the truth of the matter asserted.106 
The reverse balancing test was added when Rule 703 was amended in 
2000, and reflects a policy consideration:  it weighs heavily against using 
experts as “conduits” for hearsay by having them simply repeat what they 
have been told without relating it to their opinions.107  Again, these kinds of 
statements can be prejudicial in the sense that a lay jury might use them as 
proof of the truth of the matter asserted.108 
4.  Party Opponent and Other Asymmetries in Who Can Offer Statements 
Under Various Rules 
There are several rules of evidence that may allow one party to offer a 
statement, document, or recording into evidence while the other party 
cannot.109  The most obvious example is the party opponent exemption to 
 
 100. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 101. See Volek, supra note 99, at 973. 
 102. Compare Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 577, 584–86 (1986) (arguing that experts should only be allowed to briefly 
describe inadmissible documents upon which they have relied), with Paul R. Rice, 
Inadmissible Evidence As a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony:  A Response to Professor 
Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987) (arguing that reliance by an expert should except 
statements from hearsay). 
 103. See Volek, supra note 99, at 998. 
 104. See id. at 998–99. 
 105. See id. at 999. 
 106. See id. at 1000. 
 107. 3 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 703.02[4]. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Professor Nance discusses at length these asymmetries and their interactions with 
both Rule 106 and common law completeness. See Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal 
Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825, 876–80 (1995) [hereinafter Nance, A Theory] 
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hearsay.  Under Rule 801(d)(2), a statement is not hearsay if offered against 
the party who made the statement, even when used to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.110  Under this rule, however, the party who made that same 
statement would not be allowed to offer it herself to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.111 
This exemption to the hearsay rule is a product of the adversarial 
system.112  Normally, hearsay is objectionable because the person who 
made the statement is not testifying and cannot be cross-examined on the 
reliability of that statement.113  But the opposing party cannot complain that 
the speaker is untrustworthy, not present, or not subject to cross-
examination when she herself is the one who made the statement.114 
However, the same reasoning does not apply when a party, such as a 
criminal defendant, offers her own out-of-court statements (usually through 
someone else’s testimony) into evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.115  The rule is concerned with preventing a party from making “an 
end-run around the adversarial process by, in effect, testifying without 
swearing an oath, facing cross-examination, or being subjected to first-hand 
scrutiny by the jury.”116 
An asymmetry could also arise if a criminal defendant testified at her first 
trial but was retried for the same offense and chose not to testify a second 
time.117  Rule 804(a) determines whether a witness is considered 
unavailable for the purpose of applying the hearsay exceptions of Rule 
804.118  Under Rule 804(a)(1), a defendant in this situation would be 
unavailable to the prosecution because, as the defendant in a criminal trial, 
she would be exempted from testifying if she chose not to.119  But because 
not testifying is her choice, she would not be “unavailable” to herself as a 
witness.120  Rule 804(b)(1) excepts certain kinds of prior testimony from 
the hearsay rule, but only if the declarant is unavailable.121  Therefore, the 
 
(discussing asymmetry created by hearsay rules as well as original document requirements); 
Dale A. Nance, Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 75 TEX. L. REV. 51, 92–96 (1996) [hereinafter Nance, Federal Rules] (discussing 
asymmetry in the admissibility requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) 
that would prevent an opponent from entering the remainder of a witness’s prior statement). 
 110. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).  Rule 801(d)(2) contains other rules that treat statements 
made by others as though they were made by an opposing party. See id. R. 801(d)(2)(B)–(E). 
 111. Id. R. 801(d)(2)(A). 
 112. 4 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 23, § 801.02[6][a]. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. § 801.02[6][c]. 
 116. United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 117. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876. 
 118. FED. R. EVID. 804(a). 
 119. Id. R. 804(a)(1); see Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876. 
 120. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876. 
 121. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
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prosecution could offer the defendant’s prior testimony to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted, but the defendant could not.122 
Asymmetries like this are not limited to hearsay rules.  For example, a 
situation might arise concerning the rules governing original documents and 
recordings123 in which a document is unavailable at trial because it is in the 
possession of a third party.124  Party A could call Party B as an adverse 
witness and question her about the document to prove its contents under 
Rule 1007.125  But because Rule 1007 only allows a party to question the 
opposing party about a document, after Party A’s attorneys finished, Party 
B’s attorneys would not be able to question Party B any further to prove the 
contents of that document unless they could produce the original.126 
These asymmetries can create a Rule 106 problem.  When one party is 
allowed to offer a statement and the other is not, the first party might offer 
an incomplete or misleading version of that statement.  It is unclear whether 
the opposing party is then able to offer the remainder in response.127 
D.  Rule 106:  Finishing Each Other’s Sentences 
This section discusses Rule 106’s stated purpose, the equivalent common 
law “rule of completeness,” how Rule 106 functions in a proceeding, and 
the scope of the “fairness test” that defines the kinds of statements to which 
it applies.  This section also summarizes the only Supreme Court case to 
thoroughly address Rule 106 and the policy concerns underlying the Rule. 
1.  Completeness Purposes of Rule 106 
Federal Rule of Evidence 106 reads:  “If a party introduces all or part of a 
writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the 
introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or 
recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same 
time.”128  According to the Advisory Committee notes, this rule has two 
goals.  First, it tries to prevent the “proponent” from selectively presenting 
statements in a misleading way.129  It achieves this by allowing the 
“opponent” to provide the context in which the original portion of the 
statement should be understood.130  Second, it allows the opponent to 
provide that context immediately, to reduce the risk that a jury will be 
 
 122. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 876–77. 
 123. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 124. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 877–78. 
 125. FED. R. EVID. 1007; see Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 877–78. 
 126. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 877–78. 
 127. For a discussion of this problem, see infra Part II. 
 128. FED. R. EVID. 106; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(6) (“If a party offers in evidence only 
part of a deposition, an adverse party may require the offeror to introduce other parts that in 
fairness should be considered with the part introduced, and any party may itself introduce 
any other parts.”). 
 129. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note. 
 130. Id. 
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prejudiced or misled if the remainder is not presented until later in the 
trial.131 
Rule 106, notably, does not contain a proviso stating that it may only 
admit evidence subject to the other Federal Rules of Evidence.132  When 
Rule 106 was drafted, the Justice Department requested a proviso be 
inserted after “any other writing or recorded statement” that would have 
read, “which is otherwise admissible or for which a proper foundation is 
laid.”133  The Advisory Committee declined to adopt this proviso, claiming, 
without explanation, that it was implicit in Rule 106.134  Even after 
subsequent requests for clarification, the Advisory Committee did not take a 
position on whether the rule would allow inadmissible evidence for the 
purposes of completeness, but said only that the “fairness” test would be 
sufficient to exclude inadmissible evidence.135 
2.  Rule 106’s Common Law Roots 
Rule 106 is “an expression of the rule of completeness.”136  It has been 
said that “[t]he rule of completeness, both at common law and as partially 
codified in Rule 106, functions as a defensive shield against potentially 
misleading evidence proffered by an opposing party.”137  The rule of 
completeness is a common law doctrine that treats evidence and testimony 
about statements differently than evidence and testimony about actions.138  
Unlike a sequence of events, which can be broken down into individual 
acts, the law has long recognized that a sequence of words often attempts to 
express a single idea, one that a jury can only fully understand when it hears 
all of the words.139  Common law verbal completeness is concerned both 
with creating verbal precision and having all the parts of a statement.140 
When a statement is incomplete, either because it is imprecise or because 
part of it is missing, common law completeness distinguishes between 
mandatory completeness (the evidence must be complete before it is 
admissible at all) and optional completeness (the opponent may request 
admission of the remainder).141  Of the two, optional completeness more 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. See United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 133. 21A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5071 (2d ed. 2005). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. § 5078.1.  For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history of Rule 106, 
see Andrea N. Kochert, Note, The Admission of Hearsay Through Rule 106:  And Now You 
Know the Rest of the Story, 46 IND. L. REV. 499, 513–16 (2013). 
 136. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note. 
 137. Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th 
Cir. 2001). 
 138. 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2094 (James H. 
Chadbourn ed., 1978). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. § 2095. 
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closely resembles Rule 106, because the opponent is the party who wants to 
admit the remainder.142 
Optional verbal completeness uses a three-prong test to determine 
whether the opposing party may enter the remainder of an incomplete 
statement that has been admitted.  The three prongs are as follows: 
 (a) No utterance irrelevant to the issue is receivable; 
 (b) No more of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the same 
subject, and is explanatory of the first part, is receivable; 
 (c) The remainder thus received merely aids in the construction of the 
utterance as a whole, and is not itself testimony.143 
Prong (a) makes sure that the only remainders admitted are actually 
relevant to understand the portion; if a remainder is irrelevant, it does not 
matter that they are made at the same time or contained within the same 
writing as the portion.144  Prong (b) has come to mean “the whole of what 
was said at the same time on the same subject.”145  According to Wigmore, 
prong (c) recognizes that the remainder would be hearsay if it asserted facts 
or tended to prove the truth of the matter asserted.146  Instead, it can only be 
admitted for a limited purpose:  to help the factfinder interpret the portion 
correctly.147  Wigmore gives the following example from the Bible:  “There 
is no God” is a misleading portion if the full statement is “[t]he fool hath 
said in his heart, there is no God.”148  The remainder—“the fool hath said in 
his heart”—does not have to be true; adding it to the beginning of the 
statement need only clarify that this biblical passage does not deny the 
existence of God.  According to Wigmore, the remainder’s only permissible 
purpose is to help the listener understand this point.149  However, prong (c) 
has never been universally accepted,150 and one can see how the remainder 
might be used as the speaker’s affirmation of a faith that only a fool would 
deny. 
When an opponent invokes common law verbal completeness, the 
appropriate time to admit the remainder is during cross-examination of the 
 
 142. Compare id., with FED. R. EVID. 106 (“If a party introduces . . . a writing or recorded 
statement, an adverse party may require [its] introduction . . . .” (emphasis added)).  On the 
other hand, only mandatory verbal completeness seems to require that the remainder be 
admitted at the same time as the portion, since the evidence is admitted either in its entirety 
or not at all. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2095. 
 143. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2113 (emphasis omitted); see People v. Schlessel, 90 
N.E. 44, 45 (N.Y. 1909). 
 144. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2113. 
 145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 105 So. 2d 691, 694 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that 
the principle of verbal completeness “makes admissible self serving statements which 
otherwise would be inadmissible”). 
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proponent’s witness or else in the opponent’s case in chief.151  This usually 
applies to oral statements because, at common law, writings were almost 
always admitted in their entirety.152 
3.  How Rule 106 Functions in the Context of a Proceeding 
Unlike common law completeness as described above, Rule 106 affects 
the point in the trial at which the opponent can introduce a remainder.153  At 
common law, in most cases the opponent would often have to wait until her 
case in chief, or at least until cross-examination, before entering a 
remainder into evidence.154  Rule 106 allows the party entering the 
remainder to interrupt as soon as the portion is offered, whatever 
examination is being conducted at the time.155  In this way, Rule 106 
addresses the risk that the jury will be irreparably misled by the portion if 
they are forced to wait for the remainder.156 
The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 106 clarify that, unlike at 
common law, “[f]or practical reasons, the rule is limited to writings and 
recorded statements and does not apply to conversations.”157  However, 
many courts have found that Rule 611(a) gives the judge the same 
discretion to apply the principles of Rule 106 to oral statements.158  Also, a 
party may be able to use Rule 106 to enter a document or recording into 
evidence, even if the proponent does not offer any portion of it directly, if 
the proponent instead uses a substantial part of the written or recorded 
statement to cross-examine a witness.159 
Rule 106 does not exclude initially offered portions that are misleading.  
Instead, it offers the opponent a chance to offer a remainder if necessary for 
a fair interpretation.160  However, if there is no remainder available that 
could correct the misleading impression, the court may exclude the portion 
 
 151. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2115. 
 152. Id. § 2116. 
 153. 21A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 133, § 5072.1.  One exception is when, in 
mandatory common law completeness, the proponent must offer the entire statement at the 
same time or else not offer any of it. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 138, § 2095. 
 154. See 21A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 133, § 5072.1. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note.  One such practical reason is that a 
written or recorded statement has finite boundaries and can be “completed” simply by 
reading the whole document or playing the whole recording, whereas defining the 
boundaries of an oral statement is more difficult. See James P. Gillespie, Note, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 106:  A Proposal To Return to the Common Law Doctrine of Completeness, 62 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 382, 388 (1987). 
 158. See, e.g., United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 620–21 (11th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 576 (2d 
Cir. 1987). But see United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 
313–14 (2d Cir. 1983).  This Note takes no position on which is the correct view, but does 
not exclude from consideration cases concerning oral statements if they are useful examples. 
 159. United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 160. 21A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 133, § 5078. 
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under Rule 403.161  When an opponent wants to admit a remainder, the 
burden is on the opponent to identify which portions of the statement are 
necessary to qualify the portion that has already been admitted.162  Failure 
to identify these portions at trial may prevent an appellant from asserting a 
Rule 106 error on appeal.163  But, if the opponent fails to object under Rule 
106 at the time the portion is offered, the rule does not preclude her from 
trying to admit the remainder later in the trial, such as during cross-
examination or in the opponent’s case in chief.164 
4.  Rule 106’s Scope:  What Must Be Admitted in “Fairness”? 
When a court decides whether to admit a remainder, it should not be 
overinclusive or underinclusive.  If a court does not admit a remainder, a 
proponent’s incomplete portion could go unexplained and mislead the 
jury.165  On the other hand, admitting all or too much of the remainder may 
clutter the record or waste time if that remainder does not actually help the 
jury understand the portion.166  The Supreme Court has not defined the 
scope of Rule 106; in fact, it has only once discussed Rule 106 at length.167  
However, circuit courts have articulated various tests to determine whether 
a remainder “in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.”168  For 
the purposes of this Note, these tests will be called “fairness tests.” 
For example, in United States v. McCorkle,169 the Seventh Circuit held 
that the doctrine of verbal completeness does not extend to remainders that 
are either (1) “irrelevant to the issue,” or (2) “more of the remainder . . . 
than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of the first part.”170  
Meanwhile, several circuits have articulated positive fairness tests to 
determine whether Rule 106 applies:  the remainder must be “necessary to 
(1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in context, 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. United States v. Sweiss, 814 F.2d 1208, 1212 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 163. See id. at 1213. 
 164. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note. 
 165. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 56, at 248–52. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988).  The Court in Rainey declined 
to decide the scope of Rule 106 by finding that the evidence had a nonhearsay use. Id. at 
172–74. 
 168. FED. R. EVID. 106. 
 169. 511 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 170. Id. at 487.  The court held that this test was not met when the defendant sought to 
introduce a remainder of his admissions to IRS agents because none of his statements in the 
remainder contradicted or explained the portion, namely, that the defendant failed to file his 
tax returns on time. See id. at 486–87.  This decision interprets the common law doctrine of 
verbal completeness, rather than Rule 106. See id. at 486–87.  The decision predates Rule 
106. See Gillespie, supra note 157, at 384 n.24.  However, many courts subsequently have 
treated McCorkle as though its holding is applicable to Rule 106. Id.; see, e.g., United States 
v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 
1074 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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(3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial 
understanding.”171 
5.  The Fairness Test in Practice172 
In practice, courts often—but not always—apply the fairness test first to 
determine whether Rule 106 should apply at all before analyzing other 
potential evidentiary problems with the remainder.  Sometimes a remainder 
is necessary to give meaning to a word in the portion.  In United States v. 
Perryman,173 the prosecution entered into evidence part of a transcript of 
the defendant’s sworn statements when an attorney examined him regarding 
an insurance claim.174  In one of the statements that the government 
entered, the defendant agreed with the attorney that he “obviously didn’t 
pay it.”175  The court found that an excerpt from one page earlier was 
necessary for the jury to understand that “it” was a promissory note, and 
held that the defendant should be allowed to enter this excerpt.176 
Other times, the remainder may not be necessary to give meaning to a 
word in the portion, but rather to dispel an improper inference the jury 
might draw from the incomplete version of the statement.  For example, in 
United States v. Harper,177 the prosecution entered into evidence a part of 
the defendant’s postarrest statement in which he stated that he would 
probably be charged with possession of stolen property after the police 
found guns in his house.178  The court allowed the defendant to offer the 
remainder because it explained his prediction.  His guns looked like hunting 
guns, and because nobody in the house had a hunting license, the defendant 
assumed the police would think he had stolen them.179  Presumably, the 
remainder could rebut the inference that by predicting he would be charged 
with possession of stolen property, the defendant was admitting that the 
guns were stolen.180 
 
 171. United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. 
Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1982)); see United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 
(7th Cir. 1992) (articulating a test weighing the same four factors but with an “and” instead 
of an “or”); see also United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
Rule 106 applies only to remainders that are relevant and necessary either to qualify, explain, 
or contextualize the portion); United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 651 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(“[T]he rule is violated only where admission of the statement in redacted form distorts its 
meaning or excludes information substantially exculpatory of the declarant.”). 
 172. Because some courts subject oral statements to the same tests as written or recorded 
statements, some of the following examples will be oral statements because they are able to 
illustrate what passes the fairness test. 
 173. No. 11–CR–0100–CVE, 2012 WL 1664198 (N.D. Okla. May 11, 2012). 
 174. Id. at *1. 
 175. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. Id. 
 177. No. 05–CR–6068L, 2009 WL 140125 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009). 
 178. Id. at *4. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. at *7. 
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In United States v. Castro-Cabrera,181 the defendant was charged with 
reentering the United States after being deported.182  During a previous 
deportation hearing, the defendant was asked twice in a row to which 
country he claimed citizenship; the first time, he answered, “Hopefully 
United States through my mother,” while the second time, he answered, “I 
guess Mexico until my mother files a petition.”183  After the government 
offered only the second answer into evidence, the court found that the first 
answer was admissible as a remainder because it gave a fairer 
understanding of the defendant’s answer.184  Without the remainder, the 
portion was a clear admission of Mexican citizenship, whereas both 
answers together suggested that the defendant was unsure or thought he had 
dual citizenship.185 
In United States v. Haddad,186 the defendant admitted to the police that 
he was aware of marijuana found under a bed, but not the gun that was 
found inches away from it.187  The Seventh Circuit held that once the 
prosecution elicited testimony that the defendant admitted knowing about 
the marijuana, the defendant should have been allowed to elicit the part 
about not knowing the gun was there.188  The court reasoned that the jury 
might infer that because he knew about the hidden marijuana, the defendant 
also knew about the gun right next to it.189  In contrast, another Seventh 
Circuit case held that a defendant who admitted to smoking marijuana but 
claimed not to know about crack cocaine hidden in the car was not allowed 
to use Rule 106 to elicit the second part of this statement.190  The court 
distinguished Haddad because merely admitting to smoking marijuana near 
hidden crack cocaine did not imply that the defendant knew it was there the 
 
 181. 534 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
 182. Id. at 1157. 
 183. Id. at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 184. Id. at 1160–61. 
 185. Id. at 1160. 
 186. 10 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 187. Id. at 1258. 
 188. Id. at 1259. 
 189. Id.  Haddad’s reading of Rule 106 to dispel misleading inferences is probably too 
broad.  In Harper and Castro-Cabrera, the inferences concerned what the defendants’ 
incomplete statements meant. See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text.  In Haddad, 
however, the misleading inference was not that the defendant, by confessing he knew about 
the drugs, was also confessing he knew about the gun.  Instead, the “misleading” inference 
was that because the defendant knew about the drugs, he also knew about the gun. See 
Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1259.  In this sense, the incomplete statement to the effect of, “I know 
about the drugs,” is not really a misleading statement because that statement does not confess 
to knowing about the gun.  It merely proves a fact—he knew about the drugs—that would 
make it more likely he also knew about the gun right next to it, which he denied.  
Determining the proper bounds of the fairness test is beyond the scope of this Note, but 
understanding how broad some courts have made those bounds is helpful to understanding 
the correct approach to admitting remainders. See infra Part III. 
 190. United States v. Doxy, 225 F. App’x 400, 402–03 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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way that knowing about hidden marijuana right next to a hidden gun would 
imply that Haddad knew that both objects were there.191 
There are limits on using a remainder to dispel inferences.  Generally, a 
remainder under the fairness test has to be explanatory of the portion that it 
completes, not just of the defendant’s theory of the case.  In United States v. 
Lewis,192 Defendant Billingsley, charged with firearm possession and 
conspiracy to possess cocaine, could not elicit testimony from the agent 
who interviewed him about how Billingsley never mentioned any of his co-
defendant’s criminal associates by name.193  The court found that although 
this remainder could rebut the government’s theory about the level of the 
defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy and explained the defendant’s 
theory of the case in general, it did not contextualize any of the defendant’s 
statements to which the agent had already testified.  Accordingly, no 
remainders were necessary.194 
A remainder is often more likely to fail the fairness test when it was 
made at a different time or on a different day than the portion.  In United 
States v. McAllister,195 the prosecution elicited testimony from the 
defendant’s bankruptcy attorney that the defendant had made omissions in 
his bankruptcy documentation.196  The court did not allow the defendant to 
use Rule 106 to enter a recording from his bankruptcy hearing, partially 
because the hearing took place weeks after the documents had been filed 
and the government had not entered any portion of that hearing into 
evidence.197  Likewise, in a mail and wire fraud conspiracy case, the 
prosecution entered into evidence an instant message from the defendant 
stating that he had work for the recipient if the recipient “abandon[ed his] 
morals.”198  The defendant was not allowed under Rule 106 to submit text 
messages from several weeks earlier that said he believed their operation 
was not a scam, because the court found that it was too far removed in time 
to be contextually related.199  However, not all remainders need to be from 
the same conversation or the same day in order to pass the fairness test.200 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. 641 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 193. Id. at 784–85. 
 194. Id.  The court noted that the proper way to present this theory would be for the 
defendant to take the stand and explain it, rather than depend on self-serving hearsay, and 
that this method did not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by forcing him to 
take the stand. Id. But see United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 85 n.6 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(expressing concerns that excluding a remainder would unfairly force defendants to waive 
their Fifth Amendment rights). 
 195. 693 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 196. Id. at 585. 
 197. Id. at 584–85.  The court also found that there was no contradiction between the 
statements made in the portion and in the remainder. Id. 
 198. United States v. Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646, 661 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1369–71 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding 
that portions of a phone conversation ought in fairness to be admitted under Rule 106 after 
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Finally, the simplest rationale for excluding an offered remainder under 
the fairness test is that it does not explain the portion.  For example, in 
United States v. Gonzalez,201 the court found that the trial court did not err 
in the following scenario:  after the prosecution offered the defendant’s 
postarrest statement in which he implicated his co-defendant as someone 
who robbed drug dealers, the court prohibited the defendant from eliciting 
the remainder, indicating that his brother kept him out of the drug 
business.202  The court reasoned that there was nothing misleading about 
the portion—that the co-defendant robbed drug dealers—in the absence of 
the remainder, which was only self-serving hearsay.203  For similar reasons, 
Rule 106 does not often apply to self-exculpatory statements and protests of 
innocence that do not otherwise explain the portion.204 
One scholar has attempted to categorize the various ways that a 
remainder might be necessary to complete a portion, in an effort to identify 
which of these categories do and do not fall within the scope of Rule 106 as 
it has been applied by various courts.205  First, a remainder might change 
the grammatical understanding of the portion.206  Second, a remainder 
might directly reduce the probability that the portion is true.207  Third, a 
remainder might undermine the credibility of the portion.208  Fourth, a 
remainder might change or qualify the inference drawn from the portion.209  
Finally, a remainder might raise a related but distinct factual inference than 
the one that the portion raises.210  The scholar notes that the fourth and fifth 
categories have the potential to be excluded because they are not 




the government offered into evidence several other phone conversations from different days 
and with different speakers). 
 201. 399 F. App’x 641 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 202. Id. at 645. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 876–77 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the portion of the defendant’s arrest video, in which he explains he was only present 
with money to buy a truck, was not a necessary remainder under Rule 106 after the 
government played the portion of the tape in which the defendant says there is money in his 
shoebox). 
 205. Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 832–33. 
 206. Id. at 832 (portion:  “Yes, I sawed him then”; remainder:  “but I ain’t seen him later 
that day”). 
 207. Id. at 832–33 (portion:  “I killed him”; full statement:  “I may have killed him”). 
 208. Id. (portion:  “I killed him”; remainder:  “as I would kill any invader from Mars”). 
 209. Id. (portion:  “I shot right at him”; remainder:  “but I missed”). 
 210. Id. (portion:  “I killed him”; remainder:  “in self-defense”). 
 211. See id. at 833. 
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6.  The Supreme Court Avoids Defining the Scope of Rule 106 
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,212 the Supreme Court used relevance 
principles to address the use of a remainder.213  Declining to decide whether 
Rule 106 was implicated, a seven-justice majority held that “when one 
party has made use of a portion of a document, such that misunderstanding 
or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another portion, 
the material required for completeness is ipso facto relevant and therefore 
admissible under Rules 401 and 402.”214  Importantly, the Supreme Court 
resolved a completeness problem without resorting to Rule 106. 
In Rainey, a product liability suit against an aircraft manufacturing 
company for equipment malfunction, plaintiff Rainey was the widower of 
one of the pilot-victims.215  The defense called Rainey as an adverse 
witness, and questioned him about two statements he made in a letter 
written several months after the fatal accident, which purported to give his 
opinion as to the cause of the accident.216  The first such statement was that 
his wife attempted to cancel the fatal flight because she was concerned 
about her pilot student’s fatigue, and the second statement was that the 
proximity of his wife’s plane to another plane may have caused one of his 
wife’s crew to turn the plane suddenly to the right.217 
On cross-examination, Rainey’s own attorney asked him whether that 
same letter concluded that the cause of the accident was mechanical 
malfunction and not pilot error.218  That was, in fact, Rainey’s conclusion in 
the letter, but the trial court excluded his answer as an improper opinion.219 
The Supreme Court held that exclusion of this answer was reversible 
error because Rainey was not allowed to correct a misleading 
impression.220  The defense’s questions may have given the impression that 
Rainey’s letter attributed the crash to pilot error, when in fact the letter 
explicitly attributed it to mechanical malfunction.221  The Court found that 
the plaintiff should have been allowed to clarify this.222  The Court 
reasoned that such testimony was not an improper opinion because the 
plaintiff only offered it to rebut the defense’s implication that Rainey had 
since changed his mind about the cause of the accident because of the 
lawsuit.223  Talking about the portion of the letter in which Rainey 
 
 212. 488 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 213. Id. at 172. 
 214. Id. (emphasis added). 
 215. Id. at 156. 
 216. Id. at 159. 
 217. Id. at 159–60. 
 218. Id. at 160. 
 219. Id. at 160. 
 220. Id. at 172–73. 
 221. See id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
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explicitly attributed the crash to mechanical failure was the only way to 
counteract that impression.224 
Furthermore, even though the defense had not objected to Rainey’s letter 
on hearsay grounds, the Court found that the statement was not hearsay.225  
The Court explained that the statement was not offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted but rather “to prove what Rainey had said about the accident 
six months after it happened, and to contribute to a fuller understanding of 
the material the defense had already placed in evidence.”226  Thus, the 
Court concluded that a correct understanding of the hearsay rule would not 
bar Rainey from offering this remainder.227 
II.  COMPLETE CHAOS:  THE CIRCUITS SPLIT ON 
ADMISSIBILITY AND METHODOLOGY 
The circuit courts have been split for decades over whether Rule 106 
allows into evidence a remainder that would otherwise be inadmissible, for 
hearsay reasons or otherwise.228  Even today, circuit and district court 
opinions acknowledge this split, but do not try to resolve it.229  Nor does the 
Supreme Court seem likely to resolve it, since the only Supreme Court case 
to discuss Rule 106 declined to use the rule to decide the case.230 
The simplest way to express this circuit split is as a yes or no question:  If 
the remainder of a statement “in fairness ought to be considered at the same 
time”231 as the portion offered by the proponent,232 must it nevertheless be 
excluded or limited if it violates a different rule of evidence, such as 
hearsay?  Or, does Rule 106 allow a remainder to trump rules of evidence 
that would otherwise exclude or limit it? 
But this split is a bit more complicated than answering these questions 
with a “yes” or “no.”  On the one hand, United States v. Sutton233 represents 
the school of thought that Rule 106 was specifically designed so that it 
would not be subject to any of the other rules of evidence.234  On the other 
hand, many courts insist that Rule 106 should be subject to all the other 
 
 224. See id. 
 225. Id. at 173 n.18. 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Compare United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Rule 106 
can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some otherwise 
inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence should be 
considered contemporaneously.”), with United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (“Rule 106 . . . would not render admissible the evidence which is otherwise 
inadmissible under the hearsay rules.”). 
 229. See, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Other circuits 
have held differently, but we adhere to our own precedent.” (citation omitted)). 
 230. See Rainey, 488 U.S. at 172. 
 231. FED. R. EVID. 106. 
 232. The tests for determining whether the remainder meets this requirement are 
discussed above. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 233. 801 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 234. Id. at 1368. 
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rules of evidence.  These courts typically do so in dicta, because they also 
find that the remainder fails the fairness test.235 
United States v. LeFevour represents the middle-ground interpretation.236  
In LeFevour, Judge Posner suggested in dicta that if an otherwise 
inadmissible remainder is necessary to correct a misleading impression, two 
solutions exist:  either the remainder becomes admissible for the limited 
purpose of correcting the misleading impression, or else the portion must be 
excluded if a consideration such as privilege renders the remainder 
inadmissible.237  This section of the Note considers these three possibilities 
and their implications. 
A.  The United States v. Sutton Approach:   
The Remainder Is Admissible 
At least seven circuits have held at various times that if a remainder 
passes the fairness test, no other rule of evidence should exclude it from 
being entered under Rule 106.  These include the D.C.,238 First,239 
Second,240 Third,241 Fourth,242 Seventh,243 and Tenth Circuits.244 
First, in Sutton, the D.C. Circuit noted that Rule 106 is contained in the 
section of the rules that broadly governs the more familiar rules of 
admissibility.245  The court also explained that, unlike the other “major 
rule[s] of exclusion,”246 Rule 106 has no proviso subjecting it to any other 
rules.247  Therefore, the D.C. Circuit concluded that it should be construed 
broadly, reasoning that the drafters would have known to write it more 
narrowly had it been intended to be subject to the other rules.248 
 
 235. See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 526 (4th Cir. 2008).  In cases like 
this, the remainders never fell within the scope of Rule 106 in the first place, because they 
would not pass the “in fairness” standard. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 236. United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 237. Id. at 981. 
 238. See United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 239. See United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Awon, 135 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 240. See United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 241. See United States v. Green, 694 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 875 F.2d 
312 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 242. See United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1163 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 243. See United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986).  In this case, 
however, the court qualified the admissibility of the evidence, allowing it only for the limited 
purpose of avoiding a misunderstanding of the portion. See id. 
 244. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 735–36 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 245. See United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 246. See id. at 1368 & n.16 (citing FED. R. EVID. 402, 501, 602, 613(b), 704, 802, 806, 
901(b)(10), 1002). 
 247. An example of this kind of proviso is found in each of the cited rules. See supra note 
246.  For instance, Rule 402 subjects the admissibility of relevant evidence to exceptions 
provided by “the United States Constitution; a federal statute; these rules; or other rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court.” FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 248. See Sutton, 801 F.2d at 1368. 
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Moreover, the court considered Rule 106’s legislative history, stating that 
it showed that the drafters considered and rejected a proviso subjecting Rule 
106 to the other rules of evidence.249  The court found, therefore, that any 
evidence necessary to contextualize the portion should be admitted, subject 
only to common law relevance.250 
As applied to Sutton’s specific facts, once the prosecution admitted 
portions of phone conversations between the defendant and his former co-
conspirator that tended to show consciousness of guilt, the defendant should 
have been allowed to enter other portions of another phone conversation 
with the same person, separate in time, to counter that inference, despite 
that conversation otherwise being inadmissible hearsay.251 
More recently, in United States v. Lopez-Medina,252 the Tenth Circuit 
relied on Sutton’s reasoning when it allowed the prosecution to admit 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay testimony from the defendant’s half-brother 
under Rule 106.253  The way this case used Sutton’s Rule 106 approach was 
particularly expansive.254  The government offered Lopez-Ahumado a 
sentence reduction in exchange for his cooperation, but Lopez-Ahumado 
refused to testify against Lopez-Medina or anyone else.255  Prior to trial, the 
defense proffered evidence that the half-brother had pled guilty to establish 
 
 249. See id. at 1368 n.17. 
 250. Id. at 1369. 
 251. Id. at 1366–69.  Defendant Sucher was convicted of various bribery- and conspiracy-
related charges when he sold information and confidential documents from the Department 
of Energy to defendant Sutton through several intermediaries. Id. at 1348–49.  The 
government introduced several recorded phone conversations between Sucher and one of the 
intermediaries, Peacock (who was secretly cooperating with the investigation), tending to 
show Sucher’s consciousness of guilt, because they tended to show he was afraid that two of 
the other intermediaries were going to turn him in. Id. at 1366–67.  At trial, Sucher sought to 
introduce a portion of the recording of yet another conversation with Peacock, which 
occurred close in time to the ones introduced by the government, but the government 
objected on hearsay grounds. Id. at 1367.  The trial court wrongly (according to the circuit 
court) excluded four portions of the conversation, all of which were Sucher’s statements. Id.  
Each statement tended to clarify that he had not known he was doing anything illegal when 
he gave the documents to one of the intermediaries. Id.  Sucher claimed that the statements 
would show he was not afraid that the intermediaries would truthfully report his role, but 
rather that he was afraid they would falsely implicate him. Id. at 1368.  The trial court 
rejected this argument. Id. 
  As a side note, to the extent that the statements offered as remainders showed Sucher 
was afraid of being falsely implicated at the time he made them, see id., they probably could 
have been admitted independently of Rule 106 as statements of his then-existing state of 
mind. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
 252. 596 F.3d 716 (10th Cir. 2010).  For the narrative of this case, see supra notes 1–8 
and accompanying text. 
 253. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735–36. 
 254. The Tenth Circuit in Lopez-Medina declined to decide the case on other potential 
grounds, namely, whether the defendant waived his Confrontation Clause rights by 
questioning Officer Johnson about Lopez-Ahumado’s plea, because the court found Rule 
106 to be sufficient grounds to justify the admission of this testimony despite the 
Confrontation Clause. See id. at 734–35.  The Confrontation Clause and how it may interact 
with Rule 106 is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 255. Id. at 723. 
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that Lopez-Ahumado had possessed the drugs by himself.256  The 
prosecution initially objected to the plea as inadmissible hearsay, but 
eventually agreed to its admission so long as the factual allocution 
implicating Lopez-Medina could be admitted as well.257  The defense 
acknowledged that the factual allocution could be admitted if the defense 
sought to enter the plea.258  The judge tentatively agreed.259 
During trial, defense counsel cross-examined an officer about the half-
brother pleading guilty to possession of the drugs.260  The judge then 
allowed the prosecution to enter the factual allocution of the plea into 
evidence.261  Defense counsel did not object but sought to enter the entire 
plea agreement, which showed that the government had offered Lopez-
Ahumado a sentence reduction in exchange for cooperation.262  The trial 
court refused to receive that part of the agreement.263 
In closing argument, the prosecutor used Lopez-Ahumado’s factual 
allocution as affirmative evidence of the defendant’s guilt, arguing that the 
drugs in the truck belonged to the defendant just like Lopez-Ahumado 
stated in his plea.264  After the prosecutor argued that “the final nail in the 
coffin for [Lopez-Medina] was his half-brother’s admission under oath in 
court,” and remarked that “his own half brother [sic] fingers him,”265 
defense counsel posed a rhetorical question in response.  He asked, “Why 
did he implicate his brother?  I didn’t get a chance to go there with you.  
You saw the evidence, all of you.  Use your common sense.  Read what’s 
there.  People make deals in this business.”266 
The Tenth Circuit ruled that Rule 106 made the factual allocution 
admissible.267  Using a positive fairness test similar to that described 
above,268 the court found that the plea allocution was necessary to correct 
the misleading impression that Lopez-Ahumado possessed the drugs by 
himself.269  The court agreed with Sutton that Rule 106 allows otherwise 
inadmissible evidence to be entered because it is not subject to the other 
rules of evidence.270 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 724. 
 260. Id. at 724–25. 
 261. Id. at 725. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 729. 
 265. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 734. 
 268. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 269. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 735. 
 270. Id. at 735–36. 
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B.  The “Remainder Is Not Admissible” Approach 
At least five circuits have at times endorsed the opposite proposition to 
the Sutton approach, holding that a remainder must otherwise be admissible 
or else be excluded.  These include the Second,271 Fourth,272 Sixth,273 
Seventh,274 and Ninth Circuits.275  Almost all of these decisions seem to 
support the proposition in dicta,276 but more recently, a case in the Sixth 
Circuit based its exclusion of a remainder solely on the understanding that 
Rule 106 does not make hearsay admissible.277 
In United States v. Terry,278 the Second Circuit held that (1) Rule 106 did 
not apply to oral statements and (2) even if it did apply, the rule could not 
make the defendants’ self-serving hearsay statements admissible.279  A 
prosecution witness testified that the defendants refused to have their palm 
prints taken, but the trial court would not allow the defendants to enter the 
remainder of their statement under Rule 106:  that they would not give palm 
prints until they had spoken with their lawyers.280  The Second Circuit 
found no error in this interpretation of Rule 106.281  However, the court 
held that the statement should have been admitted under Rule 803(3), the 
state of mind exception.282 
In United States v. Wilkerson,283 the Fourth Circuit held Rule 106 
inapplicable when a defendant sought to enter part of his own statement in a 
conversation.284  The court reasoned that Rule 106 did not make 
inadmissible evidence admissible, but also held the rule inapplicable 
because the defendant’s statement was oral and because no part of the 
 
 271. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 314 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Rule 106 does 
not render admissible evidence that is otherwise inadmissible.”). 
 272. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[E]ven if, as 
Wilkerson claims, Rule 106 had applied to this testimony, it would not render admissible the 
evidence which is otherwise inadmissible under the hearsay rules.”). 
 273. See, e.g., United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982) (“The rule 
covers an order of proof problem; it is not designed to make something admissible that 
should be excluded.”). 
 274. See United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] party cannot 
use the doctrine of completeness to circumvent Rule 803’s [sic] exclusion of hearsay 
testimony.” (citation omitted)). 
 275. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 965 n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing 
that Rule 106 “does not render” otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible), with United 
States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the rule “‘does not compel 
admission’” (quoting Phx. Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 905, 913 (2d Cir. 1995))). 
 276. See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note 109, at 64–66. 
 277. See United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 826–27 (6th Cir. 2013); see also infra 
notes 291–306 and accompanying text. 
 278. 702 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 279. Id. at 313–14. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id.  The remainder was evidence of the defendants’ then-existing state of mind 
insofar as their statement was to the effect of, “we intend to refuse giving palm prints until 
we speak with our lawyers first.” See id. at 314. 
 283. 84 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 284. Id. at 696. 
1312 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
conversation that the defendant wanted to quote had been offered into 
evidence.285 
More recently, in United States v. Crosgrove,286 the Sixth Circuit recited 
a blanket rule that Rule 106 does not make hearsay admissible.287  The 
circuit court then reasoned that the defendant’s desired remainder, an 
instant message sent weeks before the portions (also instant messages) were 
ever sent, was too far removed in time to clarify anything about the 
portions.288 
A particular pattern emerges in these cases.  Courts of this view often 
state that Rule 106 cannot render inadmissible remainders admissible, but 
then go on to find other reasons not to admit the remainder:  the remainder 
may fail the fairness test,289 or may be an oral statement,290 rendering Rule 
106 inapplicable depending on the jurisdiction.  Thus, the statement itself 
that Rule 106 does not trump the other rules is usually dicta. 
Research does not uncover a case in which a court explicitly found that a 
remainder passed the fairness test and yet excluded it as hearsay.  Recently, 
though, in United States v. Adams,291 the Sixth Circuit strongly intimated 
that the prosecution’s presentation of a recording was unfair within the 
meaning of Rule 106, but adhered to precedent by upholding the trial 
court’s exclusion of the remainder.292 
In Adams, defendant Maricle, a state court judge, was accused of 
conspiring to buy votes and to help appoint corrupt members of the Clay 
County Board of Elections, among other things.293  The government was 
allowed to present portions of a phone recording in which two cooperating 
witnesses told Maricle about questions they had been asked during their 
grand jury testimony.294  Cooperator Kennon relayed that he had been 
asked whether Kennon had used Maricle’s influence to procure votes for a 
particular candidate.295  Maricle responded by asking, “Did you promise 
anybody I’d do anything for them?” to which Kennon responded, “Only 
one was that Downy boy; Bobby Downy’s brother.”296  Maricle was not 
allowed to present his very next response, “‘That’s one thing I did very 
seldom, promised to do, I never promised anybody that I would help 
somebody in a Court case . . . I don’t believe having cases held over head 
 
 285. See id. 
 286. 637 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 287. Id. at 661. 
 288. See id. at 661. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See Wilkerson, 84 F.3d at 696. 
 291. 722 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 292. See id. 
 293. Id. at 799–800. 
 294. Id. at 826–27. 
 295. Id. at 826. 
 296. Id. at 826–27. 
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forever for some political thing.’”297  Moreover, later in the same recording, 
Maricle denied knowing anything about the “Downy boy.”298 
Then the government presented another recording in which cooperator 
White told Maricle that she had been asked at grand jury whether Maricle 
had appointed her as an election officer.299  Maricle responded, “Did I 
appoint you? (Laugh),” and White said “Yeah.”300  Once again, Maricle 
was not allowed to present the next thing he said, “‘I don’t really have any 
authority to appoint anybody.’”301 
The defense argued that these omissions changed the meaning of the 
defendant’s statements.302  Although the Sixth Circuit agreed that “these 
examples highlight[ed] the government’s unfair presentation of the 
evidence,”303 it adhered to its precedent in United States v. Costner, holding 
that Rule 106 “‘is not designed to make something admissible that should 
be excluded.’”304  The court noted that such a rule “leaves defendants 
without redress” for unfair presentation,305 and suggested that the Sixth 
Circuit revisit its interpretation of Rule 106 en banc.306 
Sometimes, courts that would require a hearsay exception to admit a 
remainder under Rule 106 will find that no exception exists even before 
analyzing the remainder under the fairness test.  In United States v. 
Vargas,307 the Seventh Circuit found that Rule 106 did not allow a 
defendant to show another part of his arrest video (a portion of which had 
already been shown) because there was no hearsay exception for his 
statement that he was there buying a truck.308  The court never decided 
whether the remainder, the statement about the truck, passed the fairness 
test as necessary to explain the defendant’s statement in the portion:  that 
the defendant had money in his shoebox.309  Likewise, in United States v. 
Fisher,310 a district court in Michigan held that Rule 106 did not apply to 
the defendant’s offered remainder because there was no applicable hearsay 
exception, and only then commented that even if there were a hearsay 
exception, the remainder was not sufficiently related to the portion to pass 
the fairness test.311  Conducting the analysis in this order suggests that even 
if the remainder had passed the fairness test, it still may have been excluded 
 
 297. Id. at 827. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 826 (quoting United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
 305. Id. at 827. 
 306. Id. at 826 n.31. 
 307. 689 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 308. Id. at 876. 
 309. See id. at 870, 876. 
 310. No. 06-CR-20415-2, 2008 WL 2605405 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2008). 
 311. Id. at *1. 
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because there was no hearsay exception.312  Finally, in United States v. 
Whaley,313 the district court said in dicta that “[a]rguably, the redacted 
version of the statement distorts its meaning,” but found that Rule 106 
would not permit the defendant to offer the redacted portions into evidence 
because they were his own out-of-court hearsay statements.314 
On the other hand, in United States v. McDarrah,315 the Southern District 
of New York held that a remainder’s value in understanding the portion was 
an acceptable nonhearsay purpose.316  The law enforcement agent had taken 
notes and written a summary of his postarrest interrogation of the 
defendant.317  On direct examination, the agent did not testify about the 
contents of those notes or the summary.318  On cross-examination, the 
defense attorney asked repeatedly about how some of the defendant’s 
statements to which the agent had just testified were missing from the 
summary, and how the statements in the summary purported to be the 
agent’s words, not the defendant’s.319  The agent stated several times that 
the summary of the interview was not comprehensive and that he had 
paraphrased, but the defense attorney continued to cross-examine him on 
the subject.320  Finally, the judge allowed the prosecution to enter the report 
under Rule 106 (even though the rule does not allow hearsay to be 
admitted) because it would be the best available way to clarify for the jury 
whether the agent’s testimony was credible or not.321 
These cases demonstrate that this approach has a few subdivisions:  
although all agree that hearsay is not admissible under Rule 106, some 
courts will end the analysis once they determine there is no hearsay 
exception and bypass the fairness test altogether,322 while others perform 
the fairness analysis first and recognize that a necessary remainder may not 
be hearsay at all.323 
C.  A Middle Ground:  United States v. LeFevour 
United States v. LeFevour,324 a prosecution of a corrupt former state 
court judge,325 represents a middle ground between the most permissive and 
most restrictive approaches to remainder admissibility. 
 
 312. See id. at *1. 
 313. No. 3:10–CR–169, 2011 WL 3843699 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2011). 
 314. Id. at *7. 
 315. No. 05 Cr. 1182(PAC), 2007 WL 273799 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007). 
 316. Id. at *10. 
 317. Id. at *1. 
 318. Id. at *2–3. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at *10; see also Greener v. Cadle Co., 298 B.R. 82, 91–92 (N.D. Tex. 2003) 
(holding that two additional business documents that were necessary for context were not 
hearsay at all when offered for that purpose). 
 322. See supra notes 307–14 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 315–21 and accompanying text. 
 324. 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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In LeFevour, the prosecution offered the recording of an entire 
conversation between the defendant and a cooperating traffic court officer 
who helped the defendant take bribes.326  The recorded conversation tended 
to show that the defendant knew who the witness had retained as a 
lawyer.327  The defense tried unsuccessfully to enter the remainder of the 
recording, in which the cooperating witness told an FBI agent that he did 
his best to scare the defendant into talking during the conversation they had 
just had; the defendant was not on this part of the recording.328  Ultimately, 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of this remainder 
because it was not necessary to correct a misleading impression.329 
In his opinion for the LeFevour panel, Judge Posner set forth a different 
Rule 106 formulation.  On the one hand, he criticized the opinion in 
Costner330 for describing Rule 106 as only regulating order of proof, that is, 
for suggesting that Rule 106’s only purpose is to force the presentation of 
the remainder immediately, rather than later in the trial.331  Judge Posner 
stated that Rule 106 also allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible 
evidence.332 
However, Judge Posner qualified this by saying that when otherwise 
inadmissible evidence is entered through Rule 106, it is for the limited 
purpose of correcting what would be a misleading impression.333  He went 
on to say that, “if [the remainder] is inadmissible (maybe because of 
privilege), the misleading evidence must be excluded too.”334  Judge Posner 
reasoned that an opponent seeking to admit a remainder should only be 
concerned with “pulling the sting from evidence [the proponent] wanted to 
use against him.”335  Either excluding the entire statement, or admitting the 
remainder only to correct the misleading impression, would be enough to 
neutralize the portion without “overrid[ing] every privilege and other 
exclusionary rule of evidence in the legal armamentarium.”336 
Despite articulating a test, LeFevour is very infrequently cited as 
authority on Rule 106.  Research does not disclose a case that applies 
 
 325. Id. at 979. 
 326. Id. at 980–81. 
 327. Id. at 981. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 981, 985. 
 330. 684 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 331. LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id.  Judge Posner’s “pulling the sting” rationale has been criticized as too narrow. 
See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note 109, at 98 (arguing that the proponent of an 
incomplete statement runs the risk that the jury may use the remainder “to reach a conclusion 
more favorable to the opponent than it would have reached if neither part were introduced”). 
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LeFevour to admit a remainder for the limited purpose of correcting a 
misleading impression.337 
III.  COMPLETELY BLINDSIDED:  RAINEY, NOT 
RULE 106, GOVERNS ADMISSIBILITY 
Does Rule 106 allow a remainder that has passed the fairness test to be 
admitted into evidence despite being inadmissible under a different rule?  
This turns out to be a trick question.  If a remainder is truly necessary to 
understand a misleading portion, then, as the Supreme Court makes clear in 
Rainey, it is ipso facto relevant for the limited nonhearsay purpose of 
providing context or dispelling the misleading impression that the jury 
might get without it.338  So, if a remainder passes the “necessary” test in 
Rainey, it becomes admissible for “context” regardless of Rule 106, not 
because of it.339 
This Part first discusses the theory of limited admissibility for remainders 
articulated in Rainey and inherent in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Next, 
it discusses the role of Rule 106, and why using Rule 106 to trump other 
rules of evidence is both unnecessary and undesirable.  Third, it describes 
the confusion created by the proposition that Rule 106 does not make 
inadmissible evidence admissible, and explains the methodological 
problems both of that approach and Judge Posner’s approach.  Fourth, this 
Part suggests steps a judge should take to decide a Rule 106 objection. 
A.  No Further than Needed:  Toward a Limited Admissibility  
Approach to Necessary Remainders 
Rainey’s theory of remainder admissibility is just another example of the 
limited admissibility approach that the Federal Rules of Evidence embody 
in general.340  In most cases, determinations of admissibility are driven by 
the purpose for which the evidence is used, not by some artificial category 
 
 337. In the few instances where LeFevour has been cited in a case with an arguably 
inadmissible remainder, the remainder did not pass the fairness test to fall within the scope 
of Rule 106. See United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1018–20 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that self-serving hearsay did not come in under Rule 106 because the remainder was a 
conversation with a different person and not contextually related to the proponent’s offered 
portion); United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 943–44 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that asking a few questions on cross-examination about a document summarizing the 
government’s case theory did not effectively enter a portion of the document into evidence 
so as to allow the prosecution to offer the rest as a remainder); United States v. Vargas, No. 
08 CR 630, 2011 WL 116826, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2011) (holding that a defendant who 
made inculpatory statements in a conversation—offered by the prosecution in its entirety—
was not entitled to offer exculpatory statements from a later conversation). 
 338. See supra note 214 and accompanying text; see also Donald F. Paine, The Rule of 
Completeness, 38 TENN. B.J. 31, 31 (2002) (“The best approach is to handle the problem 
with an instruction to the jury.  If the contextual statement is otherwise inadmissible hearsay, 
the judge should instruct the jury to consider it only as affecting the weight given the original 
statement.”). 
 339. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra Part I.B. 
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into which the evidence falls.  Evidence of a prior bad act is not inherently 
inadmissible; it is only inadmissible if used to show bad character.341  An 
out-of-court statement is hearsay only if its purpose is to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted, and not merely that the words were said.342  Testimony 
about a document is inadmissible only if that testimony is offered to “prove 
the content” of that document.343 
In all of these cases, however, the same evidence is admissible if it can be 
used for a purpose other than the prohibited one.  Of course, evidence must 
always be relevant, and cannot be more prejudicial than probative:  unlike 
many rules, Rules 401, 402, and 403 are not subject to limited admissibility 
analysis.344  On the other hand, when a rule bars the admission of certain 
kinds of evidence without regard to its purpose, or does so subject only to 
limited exceptions, this expresses a preference for excluding this kind of 
evidence that is stronger than normal.345 
Rainey stays true to these concepts.  Though it is improper to admit an 
out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted (absent an 
exception), it is proper to admit the same statement for a not-for-truth 
purpose, so long as that use is relevant.346  Rainey declares remainders ipso 
facto relevant for “context” when they are “necessary.”347  If limited in this 
way, as Rainey makes clear, we need not worry about the hearsay rule, 
because providing context or dispelling misleading impressions is not the 
same as using the remainder to prove the truth of the matter asserted.348 
Of course, just as with any other application of limited admissibility 
analysis, a “necessary” remainder offered for “context” should be excluded 
if it is substantially more prejudicial than probative, in the sense that no 
limiting instruction could prevent the jury from using the remainder for the 
prohibited purpose.349  Yet, if a remainder is necessary to avoid a 
misunderstanding, especially one that the proponent created by offering 
misleading evidence, the probative value of a necessary remainder will 
often be weighty enough to pass the Rule 403 balancing test.350 
 
 341. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 342. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 343. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.  It would not make sense to say, for 
example, that irrelevant evidence is admissible if it is offered for a different purpose than the 
one for which it is irrelevant.  Nor, for that matter, would it make sense to say that evidence 
that is substantially more prejudicial than probative is still admissible for a different purpose, 
because “undue prejudice” is defined as using evidence for an impermissible reason. See 
supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra note 42. 
 346. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.  Gilliam provides a good analogy:  
when the defense tried to mislead the jury by making it look like the officer’s reason for 
returning to the scene was to harass the defendant, rather than to respond to the anonymous 
phone call about the second gun, the probative value of admitting the statement about the 
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Consider the following example:  in a personal injury suit, immediately 
after the injury occurs, the plaintiff says to the defendant, “Oh, by the way, 
when I testify against you next week in your assault trial, I’m going to lie in 
court to make you pay for assaulting my brother last year.”  At trial, the 
defendant testifies that the plaintiff said, “I’m going to lie in court.”  The 
plaintiff seeks to elicit the entire statement, either by cross-examining the 
defendant, or testifying in rebuttal, but the defendant objects both on 
grounds that it is hearsay351 and that it is evidence of the defendant’s prior 
bad act.352  The plaintiff can argue that the remainder is necessary for 
context, to dispel the misleading impression that the plaintiff was talking 
about the present lawsuit.  This solves both the hearsay problem and the 
Rule 404(b) problem:  a necessary remainder is not hearsay,353 and the 
evidence is not being offered to prove that the defendant is a violent person, 
but rather so that the jury can understand what was said.354 
Admittedly, it is a bit harder to justify using “context” as a permissible 
purpose to get around the restrictions of the original document rule.  
Consider the problem discussed above:  under Rule 1007, the proponent 
questions the opponent about an unavailable document that has been the 
subject of previous testimony or writing by the opponent, in order to prove 
a misleading portion of its contents.355  The opponent is barred by Rule 
1002 from testifying to prove the remainder of the document on redirect 
examination.356  Under Rainey, the remainder is both relevant and 
nonhearsay,357 but Rule 1002 prohibits testimony to prove the content of 
the document without the original.358 
Research does not disclose a case (applying Rule 106 or otherwise) in 
which this particular problem arises.  The best solution, however, is to draw 
an analogy between using a “context” statement not to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted359 and using it not to prove the content of the document.360  
The remainder of the document would be offered, not to prove the content 
 
gun for “context” increased. See United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 103–04 (2d Cir. 
1993); supra note 91 and accompanying text.  Of course, if a portion is so misleading that a 
remainder is necessary, but the misleading impression it creates is not particularly damaging, 
while the remainder is highly prejudicial, the court would be right to exclude the remainder. 
See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 351. The defendant would have offered this statement under the party-opponent 
exemption because the plaintiff is the party-opponent, but the plaintiff is not the party-
opponent to herself, and thus could not offer her own statements under this exemption. See 
supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 214, 225–26 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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of the remainder but only to clarify the content of the portion by providing 
context.361 
The Rainey understanding of remainder admissibility also squares well 
with the asymmetrical aspects of the Federal Rules of Evidence.362  Just as 
limiting admissibility based on the purpose of the evidence reflects policy 
concerns,363 so too does limiting admissibility based on who is offering 
it.364  For example, the reason defendants are barred from admitting their 
own exculpatory hearsay statements is so that they cannot, in effect, testify 
without being cross-examined.365  But when a proponent takes advantage of 
an asymmetry to offer a misleading portion, knowing that the rule is 
unavailable to the opponent, the limited admissibility approach strikes the 
correct balance.  On the one hand, it prevents the proponent from offering 
evidence that cannot be rebutted.  On the other hand, it respects the policy 
reasons behind those asymmetries by keeping the opponent from using 
remainders for any purpose but “context.”  This prevents the opponent from 
overriding the rules by offering the remainder as substantive proof.366 
Finally, the Rainey approach has at least some support in the common 
law.  Although common law roots are never absolutely uniform, the three-
pronged test that Wigmore recognized resembles this approach in the sense 
that the first two prongs resemble various versions of the Rule 106 fairness 
test,367 and the third prong similarly limits the remainder’s purpose to 
interpreting the portion.368 
But can we really say that a remainder that would otherwise be hearsay is 
offered for some other reason than to prove the truth of the matter asserted?  
To use one of Nance’s examples, “I shot right at him, but I missed,”369 it 
seems strange to say that “but I missed” could clarify “I shot right at him” 
without being accepted as true.  It can be even less clear when the words of 
the portion are not misleading but give rise to a misleading impression.  
Using Lopez-Medina as another example, it is strange to think that the 
inference to the effect of, “those are my drugs and mine alone” could be 
 
 361. Smith provides another good analogy in the expert witness context:  the court found 
that testifying to the contents of documents to explain expert conclusions was not the same 
as testifying to prove the content of those documents. See United States v. Smith, 566 F.3d 
410, 412–14 (4th Cir. 2009); supra note 51 and accompanying text.  For further discussion 
of the analogies between nonhearsay use under Rule 703 and for “context” of necessary 
remainders, see infra notes 371–77 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 363. See supra Part I.B. 
 364. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 366. Rainey’s holding that a necessary remainder is not hearsay solves all of the 
asymmetries of the hearsay rule. See supra notes 110–22 and accompanying text.  For a 
discussion of how this theory of remainder admissibility solves the asymmetries of the 
original document rule, see supra notes 355–61 and accompanying text. 
 367. Compare supra note 143 and accompanying text, with supra notes 170–71 and 
accompanying text. 
 368. See supra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
 369. See Nance, A Theory, supra note 109, at 832. 
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given any clarification without accepting the gist of the remainder, “those 
drugs belong to both my brother and myself” as true.370 
This is somewhat similar to the difficulty of instructing jurors on how to 
use otherwise inadmissible facts and data to evaluate expert testimony.371  
But this analogy also offers a solution:  when we say that a statement is not 
hearsay, we do not mean that the jury cannot evaluate whether the statement 
is true, but only that they may not use it as affirmative proof of that truth.  
After all, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted.372  Therefore, the jury in Lopez-Medina could have 
been instructed that they could consider whether the statement to the effect 
of, “those drugs belong to both my brother and myself” would dispel the 
inference that Lopez-Ahumado had said that the drugs were his alone,373 
but not as independent evidence tending to prove that Lopez-Medina 
possessed the drugs.374  This may be a razor-thin distinction, but it remains 
valuable because it constrains the attorneys, as well.375  The prosecutor in 
Lopez-Medina would not have been allowed to argue, essentially, “we 
know the defendant is guilty because his brother says so.”376  There is 
certainly value in preventing attorneys from telling the jury to use evidence 
incorrectly.  And, just as in the Rule 703 context, admitting the remainder 
as nonhearsay and giving limiting instructions is a better option than either 
trumping all other rules of evidence or leaving the jury completely in the 
dark.377 
More generally, though, the Rainey approach resembles other legitimate, 
similar nonhearsay uses.  In Sorrentino, the statements of the person talking 
to the defendant became admissible for context because the conversation 
 
 370. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text. 
 372. FED. R. EVID. 801 (emphasis added). 
 373. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
 374. See Paine, supra note 338, at 31.  In fact, it is possible to analyze each of Nance’s 
categories in this way. See supra notes 205–11 and accompanying text.  In category I, “but I 
ain’t seen him later that day” does not prove that the declarant did not see the person, but 
only that when the declarant said “I sawed him then,” “sawed” does not mean “to cut with a 
saw.” See supra note 206 and accompanying text.  In category II, the remainder, “may 
have,” is not affirmative proof that the declarant “may have” killed someone, but rather it 
shows that the statement, “I killed him” is not certain. See supra note 207 and accompanying 
text.  In category III, the remainder, “as I would kill any invader from Mars,” need not prove 
the declarant’s steadfastly violent patriotism for Earth, but need only qualify the inference 
that “I killed him” is a credible confession. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.  In 
category IV, “but I missed” may be credited as true for the purposes of dispelling the 
inference that “I shot right at him” means “I shot him,” but not as independent evidence that 
the speaker missed, were such proof relevant for some reason. See supra note 209 and 
accompanying text.  Finally, in category V, the remainder “in self-defense” could be used to 
counter the inference that “I killed him” was an unqualified confession, but not as 
affirmative proof that the declarant did kill in self-defense.  Thus, if the declarant had the 
burden to prove self-defense, this statement could not be used to meet that burden and the 
judge should instruct the jury accordingly. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text. 
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would be unintelligible without it,378 not unlike an incomplete portion.  Or 
sometimes, like in United States v. Gilliam, where the defense painted a 
misleading portrait of a police officer’s motivations, context becomes more 
relevant when it can dispel incorrect inferences, again, not unlike a 
remainder.379  It should not be a particularly controversial idea that when a 
statement provides “context” or helps a jury understand the underpinnings 
of something important, it is probably relevant for some reason besides 
proving the truth of the matter asserted. 
In short, the purpose of a Rainey remainder is not to act as affirmative 
proof, but only to negate any incorrect inference that would necessarily 
arise from leaving the portion incomplete.  The remainder cannot prove 
what it says; it can only show the jury that the portion does not mean what 
the proponent says it means. 
B.  Unnecessary Trumping:  Why Rule 106 Need Not 
Wipe Out the Other Rules 
Where does Rule 106 come into play in all of this?  For any “necessary” 
remainder within the meaning of Rainey, Rule 401 and Rule 402 do all of 
the work to make it admissible.380  But is that enough for Rule 106 to 
accomplish its purpose?381 
It should be.  The reason it is so difficult to draw the distinction between 
Rule 106 and the ipso facto relevance of necessary remainders in Rainey is 
because the tests are very similar.  If a remainder passes the Rule 106 
fairness test, it must be necessary to understand the portion.382  If that 
remainder is necessary to understand the portion, it is ipso facto relevant 
under Rainey.383  If it is relevant under Rainey, then, per Rainey, it also has 
a legitimate nonhearsay purpose.384  Therefore, any statement that passes 
the fairness test of Rule 106 is ipso facto relevant and has a legitimate 
nonhearsay use:  to clarify the portion or dispel any improper inference it 
suggests. 
Put simply, if a remainder passes the fairness test of Rule 106,385 it will 
pass Rainey’s “necessary” test386 and be admissible.  Conversely, if a 
remainder is not necessary under Rainey, it will not pass the fairness test of 
Rule 106, and Rule 106 should not apply at all. 
What, then, is Rule 106’s purpose?  The answer is written right into the 
language of the rule:  it allows the opponent to interrupt the proponent as 
 
 378. See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text. 
 379. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 382. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 383. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 385. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 386. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
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soon as a misleading portion has been offered.387  This was not part of the 
common law388 and it is not something that the Rainey rule can accomplish 
by itself.389  In addition, particularly in cases where the remainder is 
admissible independent of Rainey, like a remainder that falls into a hearsay 
exception,390 Rule 106’s fairness test391 still applies to determine whether 
the remainder must be presented immediately, or if it can wait until a later 
point in the trial.392 
What about using Rule 106 to make the remainder admissible for some 
purpose other than “context” or dispelling misleading inferences, as in 
Sutton and Lopez-Medina?393  If it is true, as this Note argues,394 that the 
“context” purpose for which a remainder is admitted under Rainey is 
sufficient to clarify the portion, then Rule 106 need not go any further than 
that.395  To interpret Rule 106 otherwise is to ignore the value of limited 
admissibility evident in the federal rules without accomplishing anything 
that Rule 106 sets out to do.  Though these cases may correctly admit the 
remainder, they incorrectly allow use of that remainder without restriction, 
or as substantive evidence of what the remainder asserts. 
The Advisory Committee clearly states two goals for Rule 106:  
correcting misleading impressions created by a lack of context, and 
preventing the harmful effect of delaying that correction to a later point in 
the trial.396  The ability of the rule to interrupt testimony addresses this 
second concern; it ensures that the remainder can be offered immediately, 
so that the jury is not left with a misleading impression for so long that it 
cannot be corrected.397  It follows, then, that the fairness test addresses the 
first purpose, by defining what remainders are “necessary” to correct those 
misleading impressions.398 
If a remainder is relevant under Rainey and admitted for the limited 
purpose of correcting a misleading impression, then it has already 
 
 387. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 388. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 389. Perhaps Rule 611(a), which controls order of proof, would allow a judge the 
discretion to admit the remainder as soon as the portion is offered, see supra notes 19–20 
and accompanying text, but Rule 106 insists upon it more forcefully and is more explicit. See 
supra notes 153–56. 
 390. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
 391. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 392. FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory committee’s note. 
 393. See supra Part II.A. 
 394. See supra Part III.A. 
 395. Other commentators have found differently. See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note 
109, at 96 (“[T]he remainder should be admissible for any purpose as to which the original 
incomplete part is admissible and as to which the former qualifies or explains the latter.”); 
Kochert, supra note 135, at 517–18, 527 (endorsing Judge Posner’s view in LeFevour). 
 396. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 397. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
 398. See supra notes 173–204 and accompanying text. 
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accomplished Rule 106’s stated purpose.399  The misleading impression has 
been countered because the opponent has used the remainder to show why 
the initial portion might not mean what the proponent wants the jury to 
think it means. 
In a case like Lopez-Medina, the remainder might be devastating to the 
proponent’s misleading inference:  the defendant’s attorney wanted the jury 
to believe that the defendant’s brother had taken sole responsibility for 
possessing the drugs, yet the brother’s complete statement flatly 
contradicted that inference, crippling the credibility of that argument.400  
That is enough to accomplish Rule 106’s stated purpose.  Although using 
the brother’s full statement was undoubtedly helpful to the prosecution’s 
case,401 to the extent that it was used as affirmative proof of the defendant’s 
guilt, it was not helpful for the reasons Rule 106 was intended to be 
helpful.402  It was used as a sword, to shoehorn inadmissible evidence into 
the record, not a shield, to prevent a misunderstanding.403 
If using Rule 106 to trump rules of evidence does very little to advance 
the rule’s goals, then the benefit of allowing inadmissible evidence is very 
small.  This only makes the costs seem that much higher in comparison.  By 
 
 399. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 335–36 and 
accompanying text (discussing how the rule in LeFevour limited the use of remainders to 
“pulling the sting” of misleading evidence). 
 400. See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text.  Lopez-Medina is an unusual 
example because there is no clear evidentiary basis for admitting the half-brother’s plea in 
the first place, which is why the prosecution objected initially. See supra note 257 and 
accompanying text.  One might argue that this entire case falls outside the scope of Rule 106 
because the portion was not admissible, and thus its instructive value is limited.  However, 
this fear is unfounded, because it is possible to imagine an alternate fact pattern in which 
Lopez-Ahumado’s statement that the drugs were his would be excepted from hearsay while 
his statement incriminating his brother would not be.  For example:  Imagine Lopez-
Ahumado is speaking to a confidential informant who, unbeknownst to him, is wearing a 
recording device.  When the police arrive at Lopez-Ahumado’s home, he watches as they 
approach the truck and confiscate the methamphetamine from inside of it.  He turns to the 
informant as this is happening, becomes agitated, and yells, “Those officers are taking my 
drugs!”  A few moments pass, Lopez-Ahumado calms himself, and the police have moved 
away from the truck when Lopez-Ahumado says to the informant, “Looks like the police 
took the drugs that belonged to me and my brother.”  At trial, the defense seeks to enter the 
first part of the statement as an excited utterance, and is successful because it is an exception 
to hearsay. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2); supra note 63 and accompanying text.  When the 
defense offers the first part at trial to argue once again that Lopez-Ahumado was the sole 
possessor of the drugs, the remainder would not be excepted from hearsay if Lopez-
Ahumado were no longer excited or agitated when he said it, so the remainder could not 
come in for the truth.  The court would be left to decide whether the remainder, implicating 
the brother, ought in fairness to be admitted under Rule 106. See supra Part I.D.4. 
 401. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text. 
 402. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
 403. In this context, Nance’s criticism of LeFevour seems unfounded. See supra note 336.  
Here, while it may have been tactically unwise for the defendant to enter his brother’s plea 
into evidence, the consequence that his brother’s statement became affirmative evidence of 
his guilt is too important to be explained away as a “risk” he had to “bear” when introducing 
the statement. See Nance, Federal Rules, supra note 109, at 98.  Here, merely using the 
remainder to “pull[] the sting” is a fairer result. See United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 
981 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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allowing the jury to consider the factual allocution for its truth, that Lopez-
Ahumado actually did possess the drugs jointly with the defendant, the 
admitted remainder gave the government an extra witness whose testimony 
was never subject to cross-examination.404  This flies in the face of the 
reasons behind the hearsay restriction405 for little benefit. 
Or, to return to the hypothetical about the personal injury suit above,406 if 
Rule 106 trumped the prohibition on hearsay, the plaintiff would be allowed 
to offer the remainder as affirmative proof that three years prior the 
defendant assaulted his brother.  Even worse, if Rule 106 trumped Rule 
404(b), the plaintiff’s attorney would be allowed to argue to the jury that 
the defendant is more likely to have caused the plaintiff’s injury because he 
is a violent person.  Rule 404(b) exists precisely to prevent these kinds of 
arguments from being made.407 
The only situation in which Rule 106 might need to trump a rule of 
evidence to get the remainder admitted would be if the rule in question did 
not allow evidence for “context” at all.408  But again, these rules likely 
manifest a stronger preference than other rules for exclusion by delineating 
particular exceptions or allowing no exceptions at all, and ought to be 
respected rather than trumped by Rule 106.409 
 
 404. See supra notes 260–66 and accompanying text. 
 405. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 406. See supra notes 351–54 and accompanying text. 
 407. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.  This problem is only compounded 
when courts apply a fairness test that is broader than it probably should be.  Under the Sutton 
approach, in Haddad, the remainder to the effect of, “I didn’t know about the gun,” would be 
admitted for its truth, rather than merely to clarify for the jury that the defendant had not 
confessed to possessing everything under the bed. See supra notes 186–89 and 
accompanying text.  Absent a limiting instruction, the defense attorney could then argue that 
statement as though the defendant said it in court. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
This would open a back door through the party opponent rule for remainders that probably 
were not necessary in the first place. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text; supra 
note 189. 
 408. See supra note 42. 
 409. See supra notes 42, 345 and accompanying text.  United States v. West provides an 
interesting example of what this might look like. United States v. West, 962 F.2d 1243 (7th 
Cir. 1992).  Although not a Rule 106 case, West implicates “completeness.”  In a bank 
robbery case, a court-appointed doctor examined the defendant to assist him in preparing an 
insanity defense. Id. at 1244–45.  The doctor found that, although the defendant had a 
schizoaffective disorder on the day he robbed the bank, he still understood the wrongfulness 
of the crime as he was committing it. Id. at 1245.  Because not understanding the difference 
between right and wrong is the standard for legal insanity, such a finding was inconsistent 
with that defense. Id.  However, the doctor’s conclusion that the defendant knew right from 
wrong when he robbed the bank was inadmissible because Rule 704(b) bars an expert from 
testifying as to whether the defendant was legally insane. Id. at 1246–47; see supra note 42.  
The Seventh Circuit held that the doctor should have been allowed to testify, in support of 
the insanity defense, that the defendant had the psychological disorder, but should have been 
barred from testifying that the defendant knew right from wrong on the day of the crime. Id. 
at 1250.  The court conceded that this result made little sense, but found that the legislative 
policy behind Rule 704(b) demanded it. Id. at 1248–49. 
  This case addresses a similar concern as Rule 106:  if the doctor testified that the 
defendant had a psychological disorder (this is like the portion), the jury might be misled 
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C.  Right on Rule 106, Wrong on Rainey:  
The Other Two Approaches 
This section will discuss the erroneous reasoning in both the most 
restrictive approach to remainder admissibility and the moderate analysis in 
LeFevour. 
Courts that take the restrictive view and insist Rule 106 does not make 
inadmissible hearsay admissible410 do not misunderstand Rule 106, but 
often misunderstand Rainey.  If a judge skips the fairness test and excludes 
the remainder only because no hearsay exception applies,411 she has 
ignored the fact that, if the remainder passes the fairness test, it will 
automatically be admissible, not for the truth, but for context.412  On the 
other hand, cases like McDarrah correctly recognize that remainders are 
capable of a nonhearsay use.413  Thus, when courts claim that Rule 106 
does not make inadmissible evidence admissible, they are correct, but fail to 
recognize that a necessary remainder was never inadmissible in the first 
place. 
This understanding could have answered the Sixth Circuit’s concerns in 
Adams.414  After determining that the government had unfairly presented 
the recorded phone conversations in a way that changed their meaning,415 
the trial court could have admitted any remainders necessary for the 
purpose of clarifying that, when Maricle was asking questions about the 
accusations leveled against him, he was not admitting to doing the things of 
which he was accused.416  Thus, without revisiting the question of whether 
 
into thinking the doctor concluded the defendant did not know right from wrong when he 
committed the robbery, when in fact the doctor reached the exact opposite conclusion (the 
remainder). See id. at 1246–47.  The court in West was willing to reach what it found to be 
an illogical result because Rule 704(b) clearly excluded the remainder without qualification. 
See id. at 1247–50. 
   Under the same rationale, Rule 106 should not be interpreted to admit a remainder 
that violates a strict exclusionary rule of evidence.  One can imagine, for example, a 
remainder concerning an alleged victim’s sexual behavior that, if offered during the 
defendant’s case in chief, would be barred by Rule 412 unless it met one of the exceptions. 
See supra note 42.  The policy concerns underlying this strong prohibition should not change 
just because the sexual behavior evidence is contained within a necessary remainder. See 
supra note 43.  If the portion without the remainder is so misleading as to be unduly 
prejudicial, the entire statement may still be excluded under Rule 403. See supra note 334 
and accompanying text. 
 410. See supra Part II.B. 
 411. See supra notes 307–14 and accompanying text.  Because courts have misunderstood 
the role of Rule 106, they have often applied the fairness test rather than applying the test in 
Rainey. See supra notes 307–14 and accompanying text.  But what they are actually skipping 
is the Rainey test. 
 412. See supra notes 338–43 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra notes 315–21 and accompanying text. 
 414. See supra notes 309–13 and accompanying text. 
 415. See supra notes 309–10 and accompanying text. 
 416. See supra notes 302–08 and accompanying text. 
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Rule 106 trumps other rules, the Sixth Circuit could have given the 
defendant his “redress.”417 
The error in the LeFevour approach418 is subtler.  This approach is 
consistent with Rainey’s theory of remainder admissibility except where it 
credits Rule 106 itself with making inadmissible evidence admissible for 
the same kind of limited purpose.419  LeFevour420 was decided before 
Rainey,421 so it is not surprising that Judge Posner found this power within 
Rule 106 itself, and it does the same thing as Rainey without using the rule 
directly.422  Nevertheless, it is sounder to base admissibility on relevance as 
Rainey does because relevance is fundamental to admissibility,423 and 
because it avoids suggesting that Rule 106 trumps other evidence rules. 
D.  A Complete Walkthrough:  Handling a Rule 106 Objection 
In a trial or other proceeding, when the proponent offers a portion of a 
statement and the opponent objects under Rule 106, the judge should assess 
the objection in several steps. 
First, the judge should require the opponent to identify the parts of the 
remainder that she would like to have admitted contemporaneously with the 
proponent’s portion.424 
Second, the judge should allow the proponent to object to the court 
receiving the remainder or remainders at that time.  If the proponent does 
not object, the judge should admit the evidence without qualification. 
Third, if the proponent objects, the judge should examine the remainder 
or remainders that the opponent has offered.  If the objection is to hearsay, 
the judge should determine if there is any independent hearsay exception or 
exemption under which it falls.425  Likewise, if the objection is not to 
hearsay but rather to the original document rule, the judge should determine 
whether any of the exceptions apply.426 
If there is an applicable exception, the evidence is admissible, but the 
court must still determine whether the evidence should be received 
immediately or if it may be delayed until later in the trial.  If it passes the 
fairness test,427 the judge should admit the remainder or remainders under 
the applicable exception and should not give the jury a limiting 
instruction.428  If the evidence fails the fairness test, the judge should allow 
 
 417. See supra notes 312–13 and accompanying text. 
 418. See supra Part II.C. 
 419. See supra notes 330–34 and accompanying text. 
 420. United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 421. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 422. See supra notes 330–34 and accompanying text. 
 423. See supra notes 14–15, 212–14 and accompanying text. 
 424. See supra notes 163–64 and accompanying text. 
 425. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d), 803–804. 
 426. See FED. R. EVID. 1003–1004, 1007. 
 427. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 428. See FED. R. EVID. 105.  Of course, if a limiting instruction would be required for any 
other reason unrelated to this analysis, it should still be given. 
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it to be admitted at an appropriate later time, because it is admissible but not 
necessary to complete the portion at that time.429 
In this step or in any other step, the judge should apply the fairness test as 
follows:  weigh whether the offered statements are necessary to (1) explain 
the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in context, (3) avoid 
misleading the trier of fact about what was said or meant, or (4) insure a fair 
and impartial understanding.430  No remainders that (1) are irrelevant to the 
issue of what was said or (2) go beyond explaining the portion pass this 
test.431 
If the objection is on any other grounds besides hearsay or the original 
document rule, the judge should skip this third step.432 
Fourth, if no hearsay or original document rule exception applies, or if 
the proponent’s objection is based on a rule that excludes evidence for 
specific impermissible purposes but allows it for any other purpose,433 the 
judge should apply the fairness test434 to determine whether the remainder 
may be offered at that time for “context.”  If the remainder fails the fairness 
test, the judge should not admit it at that time. 
However, if the proponent objects on grounds that the remainder violates 
a rule of evidence for which there are no exceptions435 or limited, 
delineated exceptions,436 the judge should exclude the remainder.437  If the 
portion without the remainder is then substantially more misleading than it 
is probative, the judge should exclude the portion as well.438 
Fifth, if the remainder passes the fairness test, the judge should consider 
whether admitting it for the limited purpose of “context” would be 
substantially more prejudicial than probative; that is, whether the jury is 
likely to use the remainder for the impermissible purpose despite being 
instructed otherwise, and how harmful that improper use would be.439  If 
the objection is to hearsay, the judge should consider specifically whether 
the jury is likely to use the remainder as affirmative proof of the truth of the 
matter asserted, and whether that improper use would be harmful to the 
proponent.440  If the remainder fails the Rule 403 balancing test,441 the 
judge should exclude the remainder.  If the portion without the remainder is 
 
 429. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
 430. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 431. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 432. This is because other kinds of objections will likely require the court to determine 
whether the evidence is admitted for a proper purpose, and the admission of such remainders 
will turn on whether the remainder is correctly offered for “context.” See supra Part I.B. 
 433. See supra Part I.B. 
 434. See supra notes 430–31 and accompanying text. 
 435. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
 436. See, e.g., id. R. 412. 
 437. See supra notes 408–09 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra notes 408–09. 
 439. See supra notes 16–17, 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 440. See supra notes 21–25, 100–06 and accompanying text. 
 441. See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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then substantially more misleading than it is probative, the judge should 
exclude the portion as well.442 
Sixth, if the remainder passes the Rule 403 balancing test, the judge 
should allow the opponent to offer it into evidence at that time.  Upon 
request, the judge should instruct the jury that it is not to consider this 
evidence for whatever impermissible purpose that would have made it 
inadmissible.443  If the remainder would be hearsay if offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted, the judge should add the following instruction:  
“[Proponent] presented the statement, [portion].  Then, [Opponent] offered 
you the statement, [remainder].  This latter statement is admitted for only 
one purpose:  so that you may better understand what the first statement 
actually meant.444  You may consider this latter statement to be true insofar 
as it changes your understanding of what was meant by the first 
statement.445  But you may not consider the latter statement as proof that 
any fact it asserts on its own is actually true.”446 
Since an otherwise inadmissible remainder becomes admissible for 
context through Rules 401 and 402, and not Rule 106, failure to raise a 
timely objection should not preclude remainders coming in for context or 
any other permissible purpose later on in the case.447 
If a remainder was admitted for context, then before closing arguments, 
the judge should instruct the attorneys that they may not argue using the 
remainder for any other purpose than that for which it was admitted.448  If 
the remainder would have been hearsay but for limiting its purpose to 
providing context, the judge should instruct the attorneys that they are not 
to use any statement asserted in the remainder as affirmative proof, namely 
that a fact is true because the declarant said so in the remainder.449 
CONCLUSION 
In an evidentiary system where the purpose for which evidence is offered 
matters, having the correct interpretive framework for admissibility can 
make a tremendous difference, even if in subtle ways.  This is an area in 
need of clarity and uniformity, both so that misleading statements are not 
presented without correction, but also so the rule is not abused as a back 
door to admit improper testimony, or proper testimony for improper 
reasons. 
Limiting the admissibility of remainders so that they achieve no more 
than their proper purpose strikes the right balance.  It preserves the policy 
 
 442. See id. 
 443. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 444. See supra notes 214, 226 and accompanying text. 
 445. See supra notes 371–77 and accompanying text. 
 446. See supra notes 371–77 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra note 214 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. EVID. 106 advisory 
committee’s note. 
 448. FED. R. EVID. 105. 
 449. Cf. supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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decisions inherent in the Federal Rules of Evidence while still allowing 
parties to correct misleading impressions.  The methods described above 
should help courts untangle a complex problem, and should ensure that no 
more incriminating ghosts speak out from the witness stand in the name of 
completeness. 
 
